LATINITAS AND ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ

THE INFLUENCE OF THE STOIC THEORY OF STYLE AS SHOWN IN THE WRITINGS OF DIONYSIUS, QUINTILIAN, PLINY THE YOUNGER, TACITUS, FRONTO, AULUS GELLIUS, AND SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

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BY

CHARLES NEWTON SMILEY

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
1905

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PREFATORY NOTE.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor G. L. Hendrickson in whose seminary in ancient rhetoric I began to work on the problem of Latinitas. The subject was one of his suggestion, and during the months I have been writing the chapters here presented, he has been my adviser. I take this way of expressing my hearty thanks to him. I wish also to express my gratitude to Professors M. S. Slaughter, C. F. Smith, A. G. Laird, G. C. Fiske, Alexander Kerr, Grant Showerman, and Doctor Katharine Allen, my instructors in the University of Wisconsin, to whom I am deeply indebted in many ways.

C. N. S.

Grinnell, Ia., June 1, 1906.

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CHAPTER I.

LATINITAS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERM.

It is the purpose of this paper to trace the history of the influence of Latinitas, the Stoic theory of style, for a period of two hundred years, from the beginning of the reign of Augustus to the close of the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

As a preliminary it is perhaps necessary to define the term, Latinitas. This can best be accomplished by giving a brief discussion of the Stoic basis on which the theory is founded, and by tracing the history of the development of the theory, of its introduction at Rome, and of its subsequent influence on Roman stylistic theories.

There were perhaps three considerations which had weight with the Stoics in the formulation of their theory of style. (1) Their belief that to speak well was to speak the truth.[1] (2) Their conception that the function of an orator was merely

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[1] Anon. Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr. VII.,8, W: οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

to teach,[2] and not as Cicero asserted "to teach, to delight, to move." This conception was an outgrowth of the Stoic doctrine of *ἀπάθεια*; they held that it was unworthy of an orator to cloud the reason of his audience by playing upon the emotions in any way. (3) There was the general Stoic principle that anything to be ideal, whether speech or conduct, must be in harmony with nature. Given now an orator whose function is to speak the truth, to teach, and to use language that is in harmony with nature, it is easy to formulate a theory of style, the virtues of which shall be (1) pure and unperverted speech, (2) clearness, (3) precision, (4) conciseness, (5) appropriateness, (6) freedom from all artificial ornamentation. And this was the Stoic theory which bore the name of *ἑλληνισμός* or Latinitas. The reason why the first virtue gave its name to the theory, is quite evident, for the first virtue in a sense embraces the other five. Speech that is pure and unperverted and in harmony with nature, will be of necessity clear, precise, concise, appropriate, and free from all artificiality. This is essentially the form in which we find it in its first extant enunciation, viz., that of Diogenes the Stoic of Babylon as it is preserved in Diogenes Laertius' life of Zeno (7, 59):

Ἀρεταὶ δὲ λόγου εἰσὶ πέντε· Ἑλληνισμός, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πρέπον, κατασκευή. Ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ. σαφήνεια δέ ἐστι λέξις γνωρίμως παριστῶσα τὸ νοούμενον. συντομία δέ ἐστι λέξις αὐτὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα περιέχουσα πρὸς δήλωσιν τοῦ πράγματος. πρέπον δέ ἐστι λέξις οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι. κατασκευὴ δέ ἐστι λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμόν. ὁ δὲ βαρβαρισμὸς ἐκ τῶν κακιῶν λέξις ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων Ἑλλήνων, σολοικισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἀκαταλλήλως συντεταγμένος.

As it was largely through Diogenes of Babylon and his pupil Panaetius that the Stoic doctrine was established at Rome, it may be worth while to examine the foregoing statement with some care. Some light for its interpretation may be had from Herodian who has given a similar enumeration of the *ἀρεταὶ λόγου* in his treatise *de Barbarismo et Soloecismo*.[3] Herodian

[2] Quint., Inst. O., Prooemium, Book V.

[3] Nauck, Lexicon Vindobonense, 308 ff. Ibid., 311, 5 ff.

presents three views that were held concerning the proper basis for ἑλληνισμός. He says: "Some say that ἑλληνισμός is the poet," *i. e.* Homer (he means that a correct diction must be based on the usage of Homer), "others say that ἑλληνισμός is the common dialect of the Greeks who went against Ilium, others say that ἑλληνισμός is etymology," *i. e.* a correct diction must be based on a careful etymological study of words. These three views concerning the proper basis of ἑλληνισμός are important to our discussion only as they afford one of a number of proofs that the idea of ἑλληνισμός is thoroughly Stoic. It was a Stoic tendency and almost a Stoic principle to look back for their ideals to the Golden Age when all things were perfect, even written and spoken language. There, if anywhere, would be found the "sermo purus et incorruptus." And these three views concerning the proper basis of ἑλληνισμός are but three attempts to get back as close as possible to the Golden Age and its perfection. The first view was that a correct diction must be based on the usage of Homer, the earliest poet; the second, that it must be based on the dialect of the pre-Homeric Greeks; the third, that it must be based on a careful search after root meanings, the earliest meanings of words. A careful search for, and a high valuation of the "verba antiqua" characterize the influence of the Stoic theory at all periods.

In considering Diogenes' definition of ἑλληνισμός two things are to be noted: (1) he says ἑλληνισμός ἐστι φράσις, while he refers to each of the other ἀρεταὶ λόγου as λέξις. Striller has pointed out in his *de Stoicorum Studiis Rhetoricis* that the Stoics differentiated φράσις from λέξις, making the former refer to style as a whole.[4] This affords another proof that ἑλληνισμός was the name applied to this theory of style, and that it was a blanket name large enough to embrace the other virtues. (2) The two tests which Diogenes sets for ἑλληνισμός, in the expression φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ, are evidently the tests of analogy and anomaly. From this it would seem that in the con-

[4] Breslauer Phil. Abhandlungen, I: de Stoicorum Studiis Rhetoricis, 52.

troversy between the anomalists and the analogists, Diogenes had taken the middle ground of compromise. From this we may further conclude that there were Stoics who held that the earliest speech of the Golden Age was perfectly regular in its forms and usages, and that there were not only Stoic anomalists but also Stoic analogists. Concerning Diogenes' second and third virtues of style, σαφήνεια (clearness, perspicuity) and συντομία (brevity), perhaps no comment need be made. We should naturally expect perspicuity in an orator whose function was to teach, and conciseness in a speaker who eschewed all that was artificial in diction. Particular attention must be given to Diogenes' definition of the fourth virtue: πρέπον δέ ἐστι λέξις οἰκεία τῷ πράγματι. It is to be noticed that he limits τὸ πρέπον to appropriateness to the subject matter. Cicero extends the application of the term, and demands that speech shall be appropriate not simply to the subject matter but also to the character of the speaker and to the character of the audience. This limitation of the doctrine of τὸ πρέπον on the part of Diogenes, is due perhaps to the Stoic conception that "to speak well is to speak the truth"; for the speaker who tries to adjust his language to the character of his audience, very frequently finds himself swerving from an exact statement of the truth.

The last of the ἀρεταὶ λόγου mentioned by Diogenes, is the most difficult to interpret. He says: κατασκευὴ δέ ἐστι λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμόν. The term κατασκευή is usually translated "ornamentation" or "embellishment." But it must be seen at the outset that the very nature of the Stoic doctrine would preclude any wide application of the term. In speech that is in harmony with nature there is very little room for such artificial embellishment as the Gorgianic figures. The orator whose function is to teach may not turn aside from that function to delight his hearers with well balanced antithetic clauses. The orator whose duty is to speak the truth may not swerve from a precise statement of fact merely for the sake of an ὁμοιοτέλευτον. Of what embellishment of style then could a Stoic approve? Herodian's enumeration of the ἀρεταὶ λόγου throws

some light upon this subject. His list of the ἀρεταί is identical with that of Diogenes except in one particular; it makes no mention of κατασκευή, but in place of it, mentions two other virtues κυριολογία and εὐσυνθεσία. Herodian makes plain in his treatise on ἀκυρολογία, that by κυριολογία, he means precision in diction. It goes without saying that there is a certain embellishment of style in precision of speech. When the speaker takes pains to choose the word which so exactly expresses his thought that no other may be substituted for it without loss, the style gains an unquestioned charm and grace which can not be attained by the common crowd who use their words but carelessly. And so Diogenes may well define κατασκευή as λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμόν. The Stoic conception of embellishment may have extended a little beyond this. St. Augustine in his treatise on the Stoic dialectic recognized two values for each word, viz., its sound value and its sense value. From the information afforded by this treatise it is safe to say that the Stoics took some account of the sound value, *i. e.* if a Stoic were forming a sentence and had at hand two synonyms, either one of which would convey his meaning with precision, he would choose between them according to their sound value. There would be some embellishment of style in this. As the sound value of any word depends largely on the final sound of the preceding word, and on the initial sound of the word following, we here have room for Herodian's εὐσυνθεσία.

Opposite these six virtues Herodian places six corresponding faults of style. These six faults he then reduces to three: σολοικισμός, βαρβαρισμός, ἀκυρολογία. Diogenes however mentions only two ἐκ τῶν κακιῶν, omitting ἀκυρολογία. This omission may be due to the fact that by some authorities ἀκυρολογία was regarded as a subdivision of σολοικισμός. Since Latinitas is sometimes defined as the avoidance of "soloecismus" and "barbarismus," it may be well to examine the terms with some care.

First, σολοικισμός. Three etymologies are offered by the ancient authorities, and while it is unnecessary to accept any one of the three, it is necessary to see in them all, evidence

that the word is thoroughly Stoic, and that it represents the Stoic striving after pure speech, the "sermo purus et incorruptus," Latinitas, ἑλληνισμός. The commonest etymology is that offered by Diomedes[5] who says that σολοικισμός is derived from the name of the town Soli in Cilicia whose inhabitants spoke a corrupt dialect (incolae qui sermone corrupto loquebantur). Another etymology is recorded by Donatus[6] who says that σολοικισμός may be derived from the name of the Attic lawgiver, Solon, who corrupted his Attic speech by ten years of foreign travel. But the most interesting etymology for our purpose is offered by Polybius.[7] He says that σολοικισμός is formed by merging σώου λόγου αἰκισμός, the injury or mutilation of sound speech. Herodian defines σολοικισμός as a fault in syntax, a mistake involving more than one word. He enumerates eighty-nine varieties[8].

βαρβαρισμός on the other hand is a mistake involving only a single word, a mistake in spelling which usually involves a mistake in pronunciation. Herodian gives eight varieties of βαρβαρισμός.

Concerning the third fault in style ἀκυρολογία, Herodian has a short separate treatise. He defines ἀκυρολογία as the failure to give to each object and act its own specific name. To illustrate, he says that it would be ἀκυρολογία, if one were to speak of the braying of a rooster, or the quacking of a mule. Bottom was unconsciously guilty of ἀκυρολογία when he promised to roar as gently as any suckling dove. Herodian concludes his treatise on ἀκυρολογία by devoting several pages to a careful differentiation of certain pairs of synonyms.

It is to be observed that this theory of style of Diogenes, that made ἑλληνισμός its goal, which sought to avoid σολοικισμός (faults in syntax), βαρβαρισμός (faults in spelling and pronunci-

[5] Keil, I: 453, 21 ff.

[6] Ibid., V: 327, 31 ff.

[7] Polybius, rhetorician, contemporary of Herodian. Nauck, Lexicon Vindobonense, 285,13 ff.

[8] Ibid., 297.

ation),and ἀκυρολογία (the inaccurate use of words),is in its essence grammatical.

The earliest presentation of this theory in Latin literature is to be found in the fragments of the satires of Lucilius. The Stoic character of these fragments has already been pointed out by Striller; and it seems a reasonable inference that the source of the doctrine was Panaetius,the pupil of Diogenes, who was associated with Lucilius as a member of the Scipionic Circle.

In the ninth book, the two hundred and forty-fourth fragment, Lucilius says that there are one hundred different kinds of "soloecismi." (Herodian seems to have found only eighty-nine varieties.) Pompeius who preserves this fragment, says that Lucilius not merely asserted that there were one hundred different kinds but that he actually enumerated them. There are fifteen fragments in the ninth book which have to do with the avoidance of "barbarismus," and four fragments which show that Lucilius had a very definite interest in the avoidance of ἀκυρολογία. In the fifty-sixth fragment of the second book, he finds fault with a speech of Albucius, which he compares to a tessellated pavement, the nicely balanced clauses corresponding to the blocks set with mathematical precision. His dislike for this style which made ornamentation its chief goal, is further illustrated in the one hundred and forty-fifth fragment of the fifth book, in which he declares that he will not waste his time on ὁμοιοτέλευτα and the other rhetorical devices of the school of Isocrates. He characterizes these as "petty, silly, childish" (ληρῶδεσque simul totum ac συμμειρακιῶδες).

In the *American Journal of Philology* for 1905, in an article in which he discusses the origin of the three styles, Professor G. L. Hendrickson has pointed out the fact that the Stoic theory of style prevailed in the Scipionic Circle, and that this theory was represented subsequently at Rome by a succession of distinguished orators — Rutilius Rufus, Catulus, Cotta, Calvus. In a later article on the *de Analogia*, in the second number of *Classical Philology*, he has shown that the Atticism of Cicero's time was but the reappearance under a new name of the old

Stoic theory. As has already been stated, it is the purpose of this paper to show that the Stoic theory persisted as a strong literary influence at Rome for a period of two hundred years after the death of Cicero, and that it was ever at war with what may be called the Ciceronian or rhetorical style. The evidence on this point has been collected from the writings of Dionysius, Quintilian, Pliny the Younger, Tacitus, Fronto, Aulus Gellius, and Sextus Empiricus, and is here presented.

CHAPTER II.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE STOIC THEORY ON DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS.

About thirteen years after the death of Cicero and some twenty-five years after the publication of the *de Oratore*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus settled at Rome as a teacher of rhetoric. The treatises which he has left and his formal letters dealing with questions of literary criticism, afford much illumination for our discussion. Indeed these writings show quite clearly that Dionysius' theory of style was in no way founded on Cicero's conception which made "copiose et ornate dicere" the "summum bonum," but had rather for its basis the Stoic view which made purity of diction (Latinitas or ἑλληνισμός) the one thing most to be desired in a speaker or writer. That this thought of "integritas et sanitas sermonis" was ever uppermost in his mind, would be made quite plain by the frequency with which he uses καθαρά in connection with ἑρμηνεία and the other words for style, even if we did not have the following explicit statements:

De Isocrate Iudicium, Chap. 11: πρώτην μὲν τοίνυν ἔφην ἀρετὴν εἶναι λόγων, τὴν καθαρὰν ἑρμηνείαν. *De Lysia Iudicium*, Chap.2: καθαρός ἐστι τὴν ἑρμηνείαν πάνυ, καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς γλώττης ἄριστος κανών, and then later he adds that none of the contemporaries of Lysias surpassed him in that ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρῶτον καὶ κυριώτερον ἐν λόγοις, λέγω δὲ τὸ καθαρεύειν τὴν διάλεκτον. *Ad Pompeium*, Chap.3: πρώτη τῶν ἀρετῶν γένοιτ' ἄν, ἧς χωρὶς οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὄφελός τι, ἡ καθαρὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν χαρακτῆρα σῴζουσα διάλεκτος.

The four virtues of style, καθαρὰ ἑρμηνεία, ἀκρίβεια, σαφήνεια, συντομία,

which Dionysius designates as ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι,[1] distinguishing them from the ἀρεταὶ ἐπίθετοι, are all included within the limits of the ἀρεταὶ λόγου named by Diogenes the Stoic of Babylon. These ἀναγκαῖαι, he says, must be present ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις, and when they have been secured, then and not till then may some attention be given to the ἐπίθετοι. *De Thucyd. Histor. Iudicium*, Chap. 22: καὶ ὅτι τῶν καλουμένων ἀρετῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι, καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν ὀφείλουσι παρεῖναι τοῖς λόγοις· αἱ δ' ἐπίθετοι· καὶ ὅταν ὑφεστῶσιν αἱ πρῶται, τότε τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἰσχὺν λαμβάνουσιν, εἴρηται πολλοῖς πρότερον, ὥστ' οὐδὲν δεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐμὲ νυνὶ λέγειν. Dionysius never grants high praise to any orator without first ascribing to him these ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι. In fact he witholds the highest praise from Isocrates[2] because in his excessive use of figures he has failed to attain συντομία, and from Thucydides because in striving for συντομία he has sacrificed σαφήνεια.[3] Two citations from the περὶ τῆς λεκτικῆς Δημοσθένους δεινότητος may serve to illustrate the preceding statements. Chap. 18 (concerning the style of Isocrates): καθαρεύει τε γάρ, εἴ τις ἄλλη, τοῖς νοήμασι, καὶ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν ἀκριβής. φανερά τ' ἐστὶ καὶ κοινή· καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἁπάσας περιείληφεν· ἐξ ὧν ἂν μάλιστα γένοιτο διάλεκτος σαφής· πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπιθέτων κόσμων ἔχει. Then Dionysius explains at some length how Isocrates lacks συντομία. Chap. 13 (after a long passage from Demosthenes) : ταῦτα οὐ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκριβῆ καὶ σαφῆ καὶ διὰ τῶν κυρίων καὶ κοινῶν ὀνομάτων κατεσκευασμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ Λυσίου; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ. τί δ' οὐχὶ σύντομα, καὶ στρογγύλα, καὶ ἀληθείας μεστά, καὶ τὸν ἀφελῆ καὶ ἀκατάσκευον ἐπιφαίνοντα φύσιν καθάπερ ἐκεῖνα; πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα. Special attention may be

[1] Ad Pompeium, Chap. 3: πρώτη τῶν ἀρετῶν γένοιτ' ἄν, ἧς χωρὶς οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὄφελός τι, ἡ καθαρὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν χαρακτῆρα σῳζουσα διάλεκτος. ταύτην ἀκριβοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι· Ἡρόδοτός τε γὰρ τῆς Ἰάδος ἄριστος κανὼν Θουκυδίδης τε τῆς Ἀτθίδος. τρίτην ἔχει χώραν ἡ καλουμένη συντομία· ἐν ταύτῃ δοκεῖ προέχειν Ἡροδότου Θουκυδίδης. καίτοι λέγοι τις ἄν, ὡς μετὰ τοῦ σαφοῦς ἐξεταζόμενον ἡδὺ φαίνεται τὸ βραχύ. ἐνάργεια μετὰ ταῦτα τέτακται πρώτη μὲν τῶν ἐπιθέτων ἀρετῶν. Cf. Chap. 23 of de Thucyd. Histor. Iudic.

[2] De Admir. Vi Dicendi in Demosth., Chap. 18.

[3] Ad Ammaeum, II: 2.

given to the expression διὰ τῶν κυρίων καὶ κοινῶν ὀνομάτων κστεσκευασμένα, because it calls to mind Caesar's "sermo cotidianus", and refers to an excellence in style which Dionysius seems to have regarded almost as ἀναγκαῖα. He frequently praises Lysias for using τοῖς κυρίοις καὶ κοινοῖς ὀνόμασιν. Isocrates is praised for a similar reason; Xenophon and Herodotus are commended because they choose ὀνόματα συνήθη, and Isaeus because his style is κυρία. *De Lysia Iudicium*, Chap. 3 (in an enumeration of Lysias' virtues in style) : ἡ διὰ τῶν κυρίων τε καὶ κοινῶν καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κειμένων ὀνομάτων ἐκφέρουσα τὰ νοούμενα. ἥκιστα γὰρ ἄν τις εὕροι Λυσίαν τροπικῇ φράσει χρησάμενον. And again in the same chapter he praises Lysias because he can make things seem περιττὰ, σεμνὰ καὶ μεγάλα by using κοινοτάτοις ὀνόμασι καὶ ποιητικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος κατασκευῆς. The expressions, ἥκιστα γὰρ ἄν τις εὕροι Λυσίαν τροπικῇ φράσει χρησάμενον and ποιητικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος κατασκευῆς, seem to indicate that Dionysius held the same attitude towards the embellished style as the Stoics.

It may be well however to investigate more thoroughly Dionysius' views concerning the ornamented style, for the purpose of showing that he recognized a sharp line of demarcation between the simple style which was the embodiment of the Stoic theory, and the embellished style of such an orator as Isocrates, and that he gave his approval to the former. It has already been observed that Isocrates was censured because he sought the adornment of a figurative diction at the expense of συντομία. Indeed it may be laid down as a general principle for Dionysius that he disapproved of any adornment of style for which purity, precision, clearness, or conciseness must be sacrificed. He gives his approval to Lysias who found a certain embellishment in a skillful use of the language of every day life, *de Lysia Iudicium*, Chap. 4: τὸν δὲ κόσμον οὐκ ἐν τῷ διαλλάττειν τὸν ἰδιώτην, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ μιμεῖσθαι, λαμβάνει, while he censures those like Gorgias who sought ornamentation from other sources. *De Lysia Iudicium*, Chap.3: οἱ βουλόμενοι κόσμον τινὰ προσεῖναι τοῖς ὅλοις ἐξήλλαττον ἰδιώτην, καὶ κατέφευγον εἰς τὴν ποιητικὴν φράσιν μεταβολαῖς τε πολλαῖς χρώμενοι, καὶ ὑπερβολαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τροπικαῖς ἰδέαις, ὀνομάτων

τε γλωττηματικῶν καὶ ξένων χρήσει, καὶ τῶν οὐκ εἰωθότων σχηματισμῶν τῇ διαλλαγῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ καινολογίᾳ καταπληττόμενοι τὸν ἰδιώτην.

Dionysius' attitude towards the Gorgianic figures seems to have been the same as that of the Stoics. In four different instances he refers to them as μειρακιώδη σχήματα, using the same disparaging adjective that had been employed by Lucilius in criticising Isocrates' use of ὁμοιοτέλευτα.[4] Two citations will perhaps illustrate the view of Dionysius:

De Admir. Vi Dicendi in Demosth., Chap. 21: (Demosthenes) καὶ πέφευγε τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ μειρακιώδη σχήματα, οἷς ἐκείνη (of Isocrates) καλλωπίζεται πέρα τοῦ μετρίου. *Ibid.*, Chap. 25: ἔπειθ' ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια, καταβὰς ἀπὸ τῶν γενναίων καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ σχημάτων, ἐπὶ τὰ θεατρικὰ τὰ Γοργίεια ταυτὶ παραγίνεται. τὰς ἀντιθέσεις καὶ τὰς παρισώσεις λέγω· καὶ διὰ τῶν λήρων τούτων κοσμεῖ τὴν φράσιν.

In the first and second chapters of this same essay on Demosthenes, Dionysius draws a sharp contrast between the embellished style of Thucydides and the plain style of Lysias. *Ibid.*, Chap. 1: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐξηλλαγμένη καὶ περριττὴ καὶ ἐγκατάσκευος, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις κόσμοις ἅπασι συμπεπληρωμένη λέξις, ἧς ὅρος καὶ κανὼν ὁ Θουκυδίδης. That Dionysius does not approve of the style of Thucydides is made plain in his second letter to Ammaeus. *Ibid.*, Chap. 2: ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα λέξις ἡ λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής, καὶ δοκοῦσα κατασκευήν τε καὶ ἰσχὺν τὴν πρὸς ἰδιώτην ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὁμοιότητα, πολλοὺς μὲν ἔσχε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας προστάτας συγγραφεῖς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους καὶ ῥήτορας. The fact that he assigns the supremacy in this style to Lysias (ἐτελείωσε δ' αὐτὴν καὶ εἰς ἄκρον ἤγαγε τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς Λυσίας) makes perfectly clear what he means by ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα λέξις ἡ λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελής, for in several places he enumerates the ἀρεταί of Lysias. *De Lysia Iudicium*, Chap. 13 (an enumeration of the virtues of the style of Lysias): τὸ καθαρὸν τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἡ ἀκρίβεια τῆς διαλέκτου, τὸ διὰ τῶν κυρίων καὶ μὴ τροπικῶν κατασκευῶν ἐκφέρειν τὰ νοήματα, ἡ σαφήνεια, ἡ συντομία, τὸ συστρέφειν τε καὶ στρογγυλίζειν τὰ νοήματα, τὸ ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγειν τὰ δηλούμενα, τὸ μηδὲν ἄψυχον ὑποτίθεσθαι πρόσωπον, μηδὲ ἀνηθοποίητον, ἡ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡδυνή, μιμουμένη τὸν ἰδιώτην, τὸ τοῖς

[4] De Isocrate Iud., Chap. 13; De Admir. Vi Dicendi in Demosth., Chap. 20; Ibid., 21; Ibid., 25; Ibid., 28; Ad Ammaeum, II: 17.

ὑποκειμένοις προσώποις καὶ πράγμασι τοὺς πρέποντας ἐφαρμόττειν λόγους, ἡ πιθανότης, καὶ ἡ χάρις καὶ ὁ πάντα μετρῶν καιρός. That he regarded this style quite distinct from the μεγαλοπρεπής is clear from his concluding statement: ὑψηλὴ δὲ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ Λυσίου λέξις. The style of Lysias, as thus delineated, while deviating in some respects from the Stoic ideal (particularly in the amplification of the idea of τὸ πρέπον), in the main adheres to the Stoic theory — and so presents an antithesis to Cicero's conception of style which laid the special emphasis on "copiose et ornate dicere." It may be well however to quote a passage from Dionysius, in which he describes the plain style in such a way that it comes entirely within the limits of the Stoic ideal.

De Thucyd. Histor. Iudicium, Chap. 5: The contemporaries of Thucydides λέξιν τε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπαντες ἐπετήδευσαν, ὅσοι τοὺς αὐτοὺς προείλοντο τῶν διαλέκτων χαρακτῆρας, τὴν σαφῆ καὶ κοινὴν καὶ καθαρὰν καὶ σύντομον καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι προσφυῆ, καὶ μηδεμίαν σκευωρίαν ἐπιφαίνουσαν τεχνικήν.

It is perhaps worth while to present one more passage in which the plain and embellished styles are contrasted. *Ibid.*, Chap. 23: οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀρχαῖοι πάνυ, καὶ ἀπ'αὐτῶν μόνον γινωσκόμενοι τῶν ὀνομάτων ποίαν τε λέξιν ἐπετήδευσαν, οὐκ ἔχω συμβαλεῖν, πότερα τὴν λιτήν, καὶ ἀκόσμητον καὶ μηδὲν ἔχουσαν, περιττὸν ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήσιμα καὶ ἀναγκαῖα. ἢ τὴν πομπικὴν καὶ ἀξιωματικὴν καὶ ἐγκατάσκευον, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιθέτους προσειληφυῖαν κόσμους.

It may be well to close the discussion of this topic by referring to Dionysius' account of Plato's failure in his attempt to fuse the two styles. The account is given in the second chapter of the letter to Pompeius. He says in part: "The language of Plato as I have said before, aspires to unite two several styles, the elevated and the plain, (τοῦ τε ὑψηλοῦ καὶ ἰσχνοῦ). But it does not succeed equally well at both. When it uses the plain, simple, and unartificial mode of expression (τὴν ἰσχνὴν καὶ ἀφελῆ καὶ ἀποίητον ἐπιτηδεύῃ φράσιν), it has an extraordinary charm and attraction. It is altogether pure (καθαρά) and translucent, like the most transparent of streams, and it is correct and precise (ἀκριβής τε καὶ λεπτή) beyond that of any writer who has adopted

this mode of expression. It pursues familiar words and cultivates clearness, disdaining all extraneous ornament (*τὴν σαφήνειαν ἀσκεῖ πάσης ὑπεριδοῦσα κατασκευῆς ἐπιθέτου*). The gentle and imperceptible lapse of time invests it with a mellow tinge of antiquity (*πίνος ὁ τῆς ἀρχαιότητος*); it still blooms in all its radiant vigor and beauty; a balmy breeze is wafted from it as though from meadows full of most fragrant odors; and its clear utterance seems to show as little trace of loquacity as its elegance of display. But when, as often happens, it rushes without restraint into unusual phraseology and embellished diction, it deteriorates greatly, for it loses in charm, in purity of diction (*κάκιον ἑλληνίζουσα*), in lightness of touch. It obscures what is clear (*μελαίνει τὸ σαφές*) and makes it like unto darkness; it conveys the meaning in a prolix and circuitous way. When concise expression is needed it lapses into tasteless periphrases, displaying a wealth of words. Contemning the regular terms found in common use, it seeks after those that are newly-coined, strange or archaic (*ἀρχαιοπρεπῆ*). It is in the sea of figurative diction that it labors most of all, for it abounds in epithets and in ill-timed metonymies. It is harsh and loses sight of the point of contact in its metaphors. It affects long and frequent allegories devoid of measure and fitness. It revels with juvenile and unseasonable pride, in the most wearisome poetical figures, particularly those of Gorgias."[5]

In the preceding passage Dionysius does not absolutely condemn the ornate style, but he clearly indicates in what direction his preference would lie, if he were compelled to choose between the two styles.

It may be worth while now to present the evidence that Dionysius was possessed of the Stoic view, that diction to be ideal must be in harmony with nature, that *εὖ λέγειν* is *ἀληθῶς λέγειν*. It will further appear from the passages to be cited that these two Stoic ideals were realized in the simple and unadorned style. *De Isaeo Iudicium*, Chap.16: (Isaeus) *αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, ὅτι τῆς τέχνης τὸ μιμήσασθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς μέγιστον ἔρ-*

[5] Translation of W. Rhys Roberts.

γονῆν. *De Thucyd. Histor. Iudicium*, Chap. 53: (Demosthenes) καὶ οὐδὲ τῶν σχημάτων τὸ πεπλανημένον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθίας καὶ τὸ σολοικοφανὲς ἠγάπησεν. *De Admir. Vi Dicendi in Demosth.*, Chap. 9: (a criticism of the style of Thucydides) τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ μὴ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ἑρμηνείαν ἐξενηνέχθαι τὰ νοήματα, μηδ', ὡς ἐστι τοῖς ἄλλοις σύνηθες, λέγειν ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀφελῶς· ἀλλὰ ἐξηλλάχθαι καὶ ἀπεστράφθαι τὴν διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἐν ἔθει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, εἰς τὰ μὴ συνήθη τοῖς πολλοῖς, μηδ' ὡς ἡ φύσις ἀπαιτεῖ. *De Isocrate Iudicium*, Chap. 12: τῆς μέντοι ἀγωγῆς τῶν περιόδων τὸ κύκλιον, καὶ τῶν σχηματισμῶν, τῆς λέξεως τὸ μειρακιῶδες, οὐκ ἐδοκίμαζον. δουλεύει γὰρ ἡ διάνοια πολλάκις τῷ ῥυθμῷ τῆς λέξεως, καὶ τοῦ κομψοῦ λείπεται τὸ ἀληθινόν· κράτιστόν τ' ἐπιτήδευμα ἐν διαλέκτῳ πολιτικῇ καὶ ἐναγωνίῳ τὸ ὁμοιότατον τῷ κατὰ φύσιν. βούλεται δὲ ἡ φύσις τοῖς νοήμασιν ἕπεσθαι τὴν λέξιν, οὐ τῇ λέξει τὰ νοήματα· There follows a criticism of τὰ κομψὰ καὶ θεατρικὰ καὶ μειρακιώδη. Then comes the acknowledgment that he is not the first to advance such views, but that they have been previously presented by Philonicus, the Stoic dialectician. *Ibid.*, Chap. 2: (Isocrates) οὐδὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἐπιδείκνυται τὴν φυσικὴν καὶ ἀφελῆ καὶ ἐναγώνιον, ὥσπερ ἡ Λυσίου. *De Admir. Vi Dicendi in Demosth.*, Chap. 9: (after a detailed criticism of "Thucydidean" passages in Demosthenes in which the sentence structure is faulty) τί δὴ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἐν τούτοις τὸ συνταράττον τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἀπαγγελίαν; *De Compositione Verborum*, Chap. 4: ἐσκόπουν δ' αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἐμαυτοῦ γενόμενος, εἴ τινα δυναίμην εὑρεῖν φυσικὴν ἀφορμήν, ἐπειδὴ παντὸς πράγματος καὶ πάσης ζητήσεως αὕτη δοκεῖ κρατίστη εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή. *Ibid.*, Chap. 5: ἐδόκει δή μοι τῇ φύσει μάλιστα ἡμᾶς ἑπομένους οὕτω δεῖν ἁρμόττειν τὰ μόρια τοῦ λόγου, ὡς ἐκείνη (the Stoic θεωρία) βούλεται. In chapter three of this treatise he says that before beginning the περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων he had carefully read the works of Chrysippus on that subject, expecting to find there a proper basis for his own book. But even after he had found the results of Chrysippus' work entirely inadequate, he still (Stoic-fashion) follows nature and seeks to find the φυσικὴν ἀφορμήν, as is attested by the two preceding citations, and by the following sentences from the eighth chapter of the *de Lysia*: τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὖν τις ἐπιτηδεύων καὶ φύσεως μιμητὴς γίνεσθαι βουλόμενος, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρ-

τάνοι τῇ Λυσίου συνθέσει χρώμενος. ἑτέραν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εὕροι ταύτης ἀληθεστέραν. *De Compositione Verborum*, Chap. 16: μεγάλη τούτων (the poets and historians) ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις. *De Isocrate Iudicium*, Chap. 20: (a general statement concerning the style of Isocrates) ποιητικώτερα μᾶλλόν ἐστιν, ἢ ἀληθινώτερα. *Ibid.*, Chap. 18: Isocrates is praised because in some of his speeches he is ἀκριβὴς καὶ ἀληθινος καὶ τῷ Λυσίου χαρακτῆρι ἔγγιστα μὲν προσεληλυθώς. *De Isaeo Iudicium*, Chap. 18: ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ Λυσίας μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν μᾶλλον. *Ibid.*, Chap. 3: The style of Lysias ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀφελής τε καὶ ἠθικὴ μᾶλλον ἐστίν. σύγκειταί τε φυσικώτερον καὶ ἐσχημάτισται ἁπλούστερον. *De Admir. Vi Dicendi in Demosth.*, Chap. 4: καὶ εἰς μὲν τὸ διδάξαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν σαφέστατα, ὅ τι βούλοιτο, τὴν ἁπλὴν καὶ ἀκόσμητον ἑρμηνείαν ἐπιτηδεύει τὴν Λυσίου.

It is to be observed in this last citation that Dionysius recognized the appropriateness of the plain style for the orator who seeks to instruct his audience, and it is to be remembered that this ability (διδάξαι) would be regarded by the Stoics as the chief function of an orator.

But that Dionysius was thoroughly imbued with the Stoic conception of style, is perhaps shown best by his criticisms of the writings of Thucydides, particularly by those which are contained in the second letter to Ammaeus. These criticisms are almost without exception such as would be made by one who adhered to the Stoic theory of style. In the second chapter of the letter he enumerates the "instruments, so to say, of the style of Thucydides,—the artificial character of the vocabulary, the variety of the constructions, the roughness of the harmony, the speed of the narrative." And each one of these characteristics results in a fault in style. To speed of narrative clearness (σαφήνεια) is sacrificed, for in this same chapter Dionysius says: "The most obvious of his characteristics is the attempt to indicate as many things as possible in as few words as possible, to combine many ideas in one, and to leave the listener expecting to hear something more. The consequence is that brevity becomes obscurity." The "roughness of harmony" calls to mind Lucilius' demand for words that

were εὔφωνα. But it is in seeking for variety of constructions that Thucydides sins most against the Stoic ideal of ἑλληνισμός, for says Dionysius, "there will be found in him a large number of constructions which by changes of person and variations of tense, and by the strained use of expressions denoting place, differ from ordinary speech and have all the appearance of solecisms." Eleven of the seventeen chapters of the letter to Ammaeus are devoted to a discussion of the different kinds of σολοικισμοί of which Thucydides has been guilty. This same stricture on the style of Thucydides, that it was not sound in its diction, had been made by Dionysius in his earlier critical treatise on the writings of the historian. Two citations from the twenty-ninth chapter may serve to illustrate: "'Εστασιάζετο οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων" ὑγιέστερον γὰρ ἦν εἰπεῖν "'Εστασιάζον αἱ πόλεις." "καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που" δυσείκαστόν ἐστι. σαφέστερον δ' ἂν ἐγένετο ῥηθὲν οὕτω * * * * .

The fourth characteristic and fault in the style of Thucydides was the "artificial character of his vocabulary." Dionysius frequently refers to this — and at the beginning of the third chapter *ad Ammaeum* gives in illustration several expressions from the historian, which because of their artificial character are obscure (δυσείκαστα). The last chapter of this letter is devoted to a criticism of Thucydides' use of the Gorgianic figures. His attitude towards these μειρακιώδεις σχηματισμοί, as he calls them, was, as has already been stated, the same as that of Lucilius.

To make my position still more secure it seems necessary to correct a view presented in an article on the περὶ λέξεως of Theophrastus, that appeared in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1899. Radermacher, the author of the article, entirely ignores the influence of Stoicism upon Dionysius, and even goes so far as to intimate that the first fourteen chapters of the *de Lysia* are but a transcript of a portion of the περὶ λέξεως. I will quote the summary of the arguments on which he bases this supposition. Page 378: "Ich will nun noch einmal kurz sagen, wie die Sache liegt; dann mag sich ein jeder nach Belieben seinen Vers darauf

machen. An mehreren Stellen zu Anfang der Schrift *de Lysia* wird Theophrast περὶ λέξεως von Dionys unmittelbar citirt. In einem Kapitel liegt er zu Grunde, ohne dass sein Name genannt würde. In weiteren Kapiteln folgt Dionys einer Doktrin, die älter ist als die zu seiner Zeit herrschende, jünger als Aristoteles. Nun mag man sich ja immer noch sperren und behaupten, dass Dionys noch eine zweite Quelle benutzt; ein Unbefangener aber wird doch wohl zugeben, dass die angeführten Indizien genügen, um Theophrasts Buch als Unterlage für das Ganze zu erweisen." Let us take up these arguments singly. (1) Dionysius cites Theophrastus "an mehreren Stellen"; "mehreren" means two; and in both places Dionysius quotes Theophrastus only to contradict him. In the sixth chapter Dionysius asserts that Lysias and not Thrasymachus, as Theophrastus claims, was the first to perfect a certain virtue of style. In the fourteenth chapter Dionysius expresses wonderment that Theophrastus should accuse Lysias of seeking a tumid and poetical diction, and he then proceeds to defend Lysias against the charge. In both of these instances it is clear that he is simply using Theophrastus as a foil. (2) Radermacher's claim that Dionysius in the third chapter *de Lysia* is quoting the view of Theophrastus, is based upon the fact that the words περιττὰ καὶ σεμνὰ καὶ μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι τὰ πράγματα ποιεῖ which appear in this chapter, correspond to the words ἐξ ὧν γίνεται τὸ μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ περιττὸν ἐν λέξει in the third chapter *de Isocrate*, where the view of Theophrastus is being presented. At first sight this claim seems reasonable. But a careful examination of the content of the two chapters in question, reveals the fact that Dionysius is not following, but taking issue with Theophrastus. In the chapter of the *de Isocrate* the view of Theophrastus is quoted to the effect that the style becomes μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ περιττόν through three instrumentalities, viz., ἐκλογὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἡ ἐκ τούτων ἁρμονία, and σχήματα. Directly counter to this view of Theophrastus, is the one offered by Dionysius in the third chapter *de Lysia*, for there he declares that in Lysias he has an orator who can make things seem περιττὰ καὶ σεμνὰ καὶ

μεγάλα by using the common words of every-day life (τοῖς κοινοτάτοις χρώμενος ὀνόμασι) and without touching embellishment of the poetical sort (ποιητικῆς οὐχ ἁπτόμενος κατασκευῆς). So here again he is in disagreement with the view of Theophrastus. (3) The third argument standing alone seems rather frail. It is this. Radermacher has discovered in the eighth chapter of *de Lysia* a doctrine which seems to him to have originated in the period between Aristotle and Dionysius. He concludes, without further proof, that Theophrastus must have been the originator of the doctrine, thus tacitly assuming that the Peripatetic philosopher was the only person capable of originating an idea during this period. And so Radermacher's argument when reduced to its lowest terms, assumes this form: In the first fourteen chapters of the *de Lysia* Dionysius three times presents the views of Theophrastus that he may attack and overthrow them. No further mention is made of Theophrastus. Therefore Dionysius must have used him as a source throughout his whole work. It would be just as reasonable to assert that I everywhere had followed the views of Radermacher because in this one instance I have cited his view in order that I might disprove it.

The following summary of the arguments of the whole chapter will show at a glance that not only in the *de Lysia* but also in all his other rhetorical treatises, the preponderant influence with Dionysius was not Peripatetic but Stoic:

(1) The ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι of Dionysius, viz., καθαρὰ ἑρμηνεία, ἀκρίβεια, σαφήνεια, συντομία, are essentially the same as the ἀρεταὶ λόγου of Diogenes the Stoic of Babylon. All other virtues of style are characterized as ἐπίθετοι by Dionysius.

(2) The style in which he lays the greatest emphasis upon the ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, he calls τὸ ἰσχνόν. He points out Lysias as the best representative of this style.

(3) The embellishment of τὸ ἰσχνόν is such as may be derived from a careful use of the words of everyday life, and is entirely within the limits of the Stoic conception of κατασκευή, viz., κατασκευή = κυριολογία (ἀκρίβεια) + εὐσυνθεσία. Dionysius in giving Lysias

highest commendation for his word-arangement, says that his σύνθεσις is in perfect *harmony with nature.*

(4) The Stoic κατὰ φύσιν seems to be a watchword throughout all of Dionysius.[6]

(5) Lysias is free from the use of the μειρακιώδη σχήματα, the Gorgianic figures, which Dionysius everywhere speaks of with depreciation bordering on contempt. Our author admits that Philonicus, the Stoic dialectician, has expressed similar views concerning the figures of Gorgias. Isocrates is severely censured because in the use of these figures he has sacrificed the Stoic virtue συντομία.

(6) Plato, who receives unmeasured praise when he uses the simple, unadorned style (τὸ ἰσχνόν), is criticised when he essays the opposite style, because κάκιον ἑλληνίζουσα he sacrifices the Stoic virtues σαφήνεια and συντομία.

(7) Thucydides, the canon of this opposite style, is likewise censured for the lack of σαφήνεια. The strictures on Thucydides in the second letter to Ammaeus, are all from the Stoic view-point. The main purpose of the letter seems to be to show how Thucydides has failed to attain the true ἑλληνισμός; two-thirds of its pages are devoted to an exposition of the different types of σολοικισμοί of which he has been guilty.

(8) Even Demosthenes does not escape censure for his "Thucydidean" passages; and he receives his highest praise for those speeches, where his style like that of Lysias is based on the ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι. It everywhere appears that the "middle style" of Demosthenes is far nearer to the style of Lysias than to the opposite style of Thucydides.

As a fitting conclusion of this discussion of Dionysius' con-

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[6] At only one point does Dionysius take direct issue with the Stoics in their harmony-with-nature doctrine. When this doctrine develops into an archaizing tendency and into a search for the "verba antiqua", he objects that the Stoic theory is at war with itself, in so far as the "verba antiqua" are obsolete and unintelligible. For himself, he holds fast to the other Stoic virtue, perspicuity. His position is made clear in the seventh section of the tenth chapter of the *Ars Rhetorica.*

ception of style, there may be quoted a sentence from the third chapter of *ad Pompeium*: πρώτη τῶν ἀρετῶν γένοιτ' ἄν, ἧς χωρὶς οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους ὄφελός τι, ἢ καθαρὰ τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν χαρακτῆρα σῴζουσα διάλεκτος. This clearly is the Stoic ideal of ἑλληνισμός or Latinitas as a theory of style.

CHAPTER III.

QUINTILIAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS LATINITAS.

About a century after the death of Dionysius, Quintilian wrote his *de Institutione Oratoria*. In this treatise we again have a sure proof of the strong establishment of the Stoic theory. Although Quintilian professed to be and was a follower of Cicero in his stylistic theory, he seems to have been compelled to give a larger place in his treatise to Stoic principles than Cicero had been willing to give. The subject of Latinitas had been dismissed summarily by Cicero with a page or two in the *de Oratore*. Quintilian carefully elaborates it in twenty-five pages,—and throughout his whole treatise we find proof that the Stoic theory was a factor that had to be considered. "Quid enim tam necessarium quam recta locutio?" In I: 8, 13 he says the pupil must first be taught "quae barbara, quae impropria, quae contra leges loquendi sint posita"; again in I: 5, 5: "Prima barbarismi ac soloecismi foeditas absit." And what are the laws by which speech may be tested and the rank fault of "barbarismus" and "soloecismus" avoided? In I:6, 1 he establishes the standard when he says: "Sermo constat *ratione* vel *vetustate*, *auctoritate*, *consuetudine*. *Rationem* praestat praecipue *analogia*, nonnumquam et *etymologia*." We have here nothing more nor less than Varro's definition of Latinitas. Quintilian twice repeats this statement.[1] And yet his hostility

[1] Quint. IX: 3, 2: Esset enim orationis schema vitium, si non peteretur sed accideret. Verum auctoritate, vetustate, consuetudine plerumque defenditur saepe etiam ratione quadam. Ibid. I: 5, 5: Prima barbarismi ac soloecismi foeditas absit. Sed quia interim excusantur haec vitia aut consuetudine aut auctoritate aut vetustate aut denique vicinitate virtutum; nam saepe a figuris ea separare difficile est. Ibid. I: 6, 20.

to Latinitas as an ideal of style is manifest in his detailed discussion of these four standards of correct speech. He takes great pains to show how each may be pressed too far, intimating that there were those among his contemporaries who did press them too far. After he has shown how the law of analogy fails in the case of such imperatives as "fac" and "dic", in the declension of "lepus" and "lupus", in the formation of the perfect for the two verbs which have "volo" in the present indicative, he adds "the law of analogy was not let down from heaven when men were first created, to establish for them a correct form of speech."[2] (This is clearly a thrust at the Stoic view that the earliest speech was the purest.) Concerning "vetustas", he admits that the "verba antiqua" bring to speech a certain "maiestas", "delectatio" and "novitas", but he bids the young orator beware of such ancient words as "topper", "antegerio" and "prosapia" which have to be interpreted.[3] Regarding "auctoritas" he says no one would use "lodices" even on the authority of Pollio, or "gladiola" and "parricidatum", which appear in the speeches of Messalla and Caelius.[4] "Consuetudo"

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[2] Ibid. I: 6, 12; I 6, 21. Ibid. I: 6, 16: Non enim, cum primum fingerentur homines, analogia demissa caelo formam loquendi dedit, sed inventa est, postquam loquebantur, et notatum in sermone, quid quomodo caderet. Itaque non ratione nititur sed exemplo, nec lex est loquendi sed observatio, ut ipsam analogiam nulla res alia fecerit quam consuetudo.

[3] Ibid. I: 6, 39: Verba a vetustate repetita non solum magnos assertores habent sed etiam afferunt orationi maiestatem aliquam non sine delectatione; nam et auctoritatem antiquitatis habent et, quia intermissa sunt, gratiam novitati similem parant. Sed opus est modo, ut neque crebra sint haec neque manifesta, quia nihil est odiosius affectatione, nec utique ab ultimis et iam oblitteratis repetita temporibus, qualia sunt topper et antegerio et exanclare et prosapia et Saliorum carmina vix sacerdotibus suis satis intellecta. Sed illa mutari vetat religio et consecratis utendum est; oratio vero cuius summa virtus est perspicuitas, quam sit vitiosa, si egeat interprete.

[4] Ibid. I: 6, 42: Similis circa auctoritatem ratio. Nam etiamsi potest videri nihil peccare, qui utitur his verbis, quae summi auctores tradiderunt, multum tamen refert non solum, quid dixerint sed etiam quid persuaserint. Neque enim tuburchinabundum et lurchinabundum iam in nobis quisquam ferat, licet Cato sit auctor, nec hos lodices, quam-

which he calls the "surest rule of speech", he limits by saying "consuetudinem sermonis vocabo consensum eruditorum."[5]

Quintilian devotes three pages to a discussion of "soloecismus". Concerning the number of varieties, he indicates that there was a disagreement among the authorities of his day. His own view of "soloecismus" is essentially the same as that of the Stoic Diogenes, *i. e.* it consists in a fault in syntax. Indeed Quintilian's "soloecismus" by "adiectione", "detractione", inversione", "transmutatione" finds exact equivalents in Herodian's terminology. Quintilian gives detailed account of how a noun may suffer from "soloecismus" in gender, number, and case; and so on with the other parts of speech. In making his illustrations in four instances he uses the same words that Lucilius had used as illustrations more than two hundred years before.[6] And doubtless if we had the whole of the ninth book of Lucilius, there would be many similar things to prove the continuity of the Stoic tradition.

Concerning "barbarismus" Quintilian has a four page discussion, to which may be properly added three pages *de Orthographia.* In the latter he seems to have depended largely on Lucilius, for he twice cites that author as an authority; in the former his views are in harmony with those of Herodian, *i. e.* "barbarismus" is a fault in pronunciation or spelling.[7]

Before taking up in Quintilian the other evidence that the Stoic theory was strongly established in his time, it may be of advantage to show briefly how closely Quintilian himself followed Cicero's theory. (1) He makes the same divisions of rhetoric as Cicero, viz., "inventio", "dispositio", "elocutio", "memoria", "actio".[8] (2) Like Cicero he maintained that the function of an orator is three-fold: to teach, to delight, to

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quam id Pollioni placet, nec gladiola, atqui Mesalla dixit, nec parricidatum quod in Caelio vix tolerabile videtur, nec collos mihi Calvus persuaserit quae nec ipsi iam dicerent.

[5] Ibid. I: 6, 45.

[6] Ibid. I: 5, 50. Cf. Lucilius, 245, 250, 256, 263 (Baehrens).

[7] Ibid., I: 5, 6 ff.

[8] Ibid., III: 3, 1.

move.[9] (3) He believed in "copia" rather than in "brevitas", συντομία.[10] (4) Like Cicero he lays special emphasis on "ornatus", giving to that more attention than to all the other virtues of speech combined.[11] "For" he adds "scant is the reward of those who simply speak correct Latin and clearly."[12] This last is but one of many thrusts at the Stoic ideal. In the prooemium of book five he says: "There have been indeed distinguished authorities who have felt that the function of an orator was simply to teach; for they thought that all feeling should be excluded for a two-fold reason (1) because everything that perturbed the mind was an evil, and (2) because the judge ought not to be diverted from the truth by pity, gratitude and similar emotions." Here we have without question the Stoic doctrine of ἀπάθεια as a basis of the Stoic theory that made "docere" its goal,[13] for the attainment of which "Latine et plane dicere" was the sole requisite. But it was not simply the doctrine of "apathy", but also the Stoic desire to be in harmony with nature. There are four passages in Quintilian which bear on this point. In XII: 10, 40 he says: "Certain ones think that no eloquence is in harmony with nature except

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[9] Ibid., III: 5, 2: doceat, moveat, delectet.

[10] Ibid., III: 4, 5: Eloquentia quoque non mediocri est opus, ut de unaquaque earum, quas demonstravimus, rerum dicat proprie et copiose.

[11] Ibid., I: 5, 1: Iam cum omnis oratio tres habeat virtutes, ut emendata, ut dilucida, ut ornata sit (quia dicere apte, quod est praecipuum, plerique ornatui subiiciunt).

[12] Ibid., VIII: 3, 1: Venio nunc ad ornatum, in quo sine dubio plusquam in ceteris dicendi partibus sibi indulget orator. Nam emendate quidem ac lucide dicentium tenue praemium est. Ibid., XII: 2, 25: Stoici, sicut copiam nitoremque eloquentiae fere praeceptoribus suis defuisse concedant necesse est, ita nullos aut probare acrius aut concludere subtilius contendunt.

[13] Ibid., Prooemium, Book V: Fuerunt et clari quidam auctores, quibus solum videretur oratoris officium *docere*; namque et effectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia iudicem a veritate pelli misericordia, gratia, similibusque non oporteret, et voluptatem audientium petere cum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur. Ibid., VIII: 3, 86: Non tamen satis eloquentiae est, ea, de quibus dicat, clare atque evidenter ostendere.

that which is most like the speech of every-day life (cotidiano sermoni) which we use in talking with friends, wives, children, servants, in which we are content to express simply the will of the mind, calling in nothing extraneous and seeking nothing elaborate; whatever is in addition to this, savors of affectation and ambitious vaunting."[14] Here we have not only the Stoic desire to be in harmony with nature, but also, linked with it, a protest against the "copia" and "ornatus" of Cicero. Again (IX: 4, 3): "Nor am I ignorant that there are certain ones who put aside all painstaking care in the matter of sentence structure, who maintain that the rough style of speech that flows haphazard, is not only more in harmony with nature but also more virile. But if they say that is in harmony with nature which first sprang from nature and existed before there was any culture, they subvert the whole art of oratory." This recalls Lucilius' protest against the well-balanced sentences and the Gorgianic figures of Isocrates. This harmony with nature in speech was to be attained by a reading of ancient writers. In X: 1, 43 Quintilian says: "For certain ones maintain that only the ancient writers are to be read, and they think that in no others is there an eloquence to be found in harmony with nature."[15] This thought is repeated in XII: 10, 42: "Denique antiquissimum quemque maxime *secundum naturam* dixisse contendunt."

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[14] Ibid., XII: 10, 40: Ad hoc quidam nullam esse naturalem putant eloquentiam, nisi quae sit cotidiano sermoni simillima, quo cum amicis, coniugibus, liberis, servis, loquamur, contento promere animi voluntatem nihilque et arcessiti et elaborati requirente; quidquid huc sit adiectum, id esse affectationis et ambitiosae in loquendo iactantiae, remotum a veritate fictumque ipsorum gratia verborum, quibus solum natura sit officium attributum, servire sensibus. Cf. Plutarch, de Com. Not., 1297, 8 ff. (Didot) Ibid., IX: 4, 3: Neque ignoro quosdam esse, qui curam omnem compositionis excludant, atque illum horridum sermonem, ut forte fluxerit, modo magis naturalem modo etiam magis virilem esse contendant. Qui si id demum naturale esse dicunt, quod a natura primum ortum est et quale ante cultum fuit: tota haec ars orandi subvertitur.

[15] Ibid., X: 1, 43: Nam quidam solos veteres legendos putant neque in ullis aliis esse naturalem eloquentiam et robur viris dignum arbitrantur.

The four passages just quoted call to mind "natura", "consuetudo", "auctoritas", three of the standards which Varro set up in his definition of Latinitas.

This harking back to antiquity for a vocabulary, this applying of rigid tests to every word, in the opinion of Quintilian, robbed speech of its power.[16] He was never tired of warning his pupils against the pitfalls that lie before those who set up such a rigid standard.[17] He tells them that if with too great admiration they read Cato and those like him, they will become "horridi et ieiuni."[18] He fleers at those who having brought forth "horride atque incomposite" a style that is "frigidum et inane", feel that they are equal to the ancient Attici.[19] He jibes at Sallust, because the historian has stolen many ancient words of Cato.[20] He ridicules those who search out single words, and then measure the words they have found with a yardstick or weigh them with a balance.[21] Certain others he taunts with vexing their souls over single syllables, declaring that after they have found words that are the very best, they will search for something "magis antiquum, remotum, inopinatum."[22] This search for *the* word is the Stoic κυριολογία.

[16] Ibid., X: 7, 14.

[17] Ibid., Prooemium, Book VIII.

[18] Ibid., II: 5, 21: Duo autem genera maxime cavenda pueris puto: unum ne quis eos antiquitatis nimius admirator in Gracchorum Catonisque et aliorum similium lectione durescere velit; fient enim horridi et ieiuni.

[19] Ibid., X: 2, 17: Ideoque qui horride atque incomposite quamlibet illud frigidum et inane extulerunt, antiquis se pares credunt; qui carent cultu atque sententiis, Atticis scilicet; qui praecisis conclusionibus obscuri, Sallustium atque Thucydidem superant; tristes ac ieiuni Pollionem aemulantur.

[20] Ibid., VIII: 3, 29: Et verba antiqui multum furate Catonis,
Crispe, Iugurthinae conditor historiae.

[21] Ibid., Prooemium, Book VIII: Quasi vero sit ulla verborum nisi rei cohaerentium virtus; quae ut propria sint dilucida et ornata et apte collocentur, si tota vita laborandum est: omnis studiorum fructus amissus est. Atqui plerosque videas haerentes circa singula, et dum inveniunt dum inventa ponderant ac dimetiuntur.

[22] Ibid., Prooemium, Book VIII: Quibusdam tamen nullus est finis calumniandi se et cum singulis paene syllabis commoriendi, qui etiam, cum optima sunt reperta, quaerunt aliquid, quod sit magis antiquum, remotum, inopinatum.

of Herodian, and they who carry it to the extreme, speak "curiose" and not "Latine", says Quintilian.[23]

The baleful effect of this overscrupulous care in the selection of words, Quintilian sets forth in the twenty-seventh section of the introduction to the eighth book where he says: "Quod si idcirco fieret, ut semper optimis uterentur: abominanda tamen haec infelicitas erat, quae et cursum dicendi refrenat et calorem cogitationis extinguit mora atque diffidentia. *Miser enim et, ut sic dicam, pauper orator est, qui nullum verbum aequo animo perdere potest.*"

It remains to show that this Stoic theory against which Quintilian protested, was but a continuation of the Atticism of Cicero's time. Quintilian says (X: 1, 115) : "I have found those who place Calvus above all other orators" and then, after repeating Cicero's estimate of Calvus, he adds, "Imitator est Atticorum."[24] The two adjectives which Quintilian uses to characterize the "Attici", in distinguishing them from those who follow the Asian style, are "pressi et integri." "Integri" recalls the "integritas sermonis" of Catulus and represents the Stoic "sermo incorruptus", Latinitas. "Pressi" is the Stoic brevity, the συντομία of Diogenes.[25] Quintilian points out that this brevity in the case of the Atticists has resulted in a style that is meagre (tenue). In X: 1, 44 he says: "Even of those who wish to follow a true style of speech, there are some who think that style is sound and truly Attic, which is *pressum*

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[23] Ibid., VIII: 1, 2: Multos enim, quibus loquendi ratio non desit, invenias, quos curiose potius loqui dixeris quam Latine. Ibid., VIII: 2, 21: Pervasit iam multos ista persuasio, ut id iam demum eleganter atque exquisite dictum putent, quod interpretandum sit.

[24] Ibid., X: 1, 115: Inveni qui Calvum praeferrent omnibus, inveni qui Ciceroni crederent, cum nimia contra se calumnia verum sanguinem perdidisse; sed est et sancta et gravis oratio et custodita et frequenter vehemens quoque. Imitator est Atticorum, fecitque illi properata mors iniuriam, si quid adiecturus sibi, non si quid detracturus fuit.

[25] Ibid., XII: 10, 16: Et antiqua quidem illa divisio inter Atticos atque Asianos fuit, cum hi pressi et integri; contra inflati illi et inanes haberentur.

and *tenue* and least removed from the usage of daily life."[26] Again (XII: 10, 21): "Wherefore they seem to me greatly to be deceived, who believe that the only true Attici are those who are *tenues et lucidi et significantes*, who are contented with a certain meagre style of eloquence and who always keep their hand beneath their mantle."[27] (The last phrase "ac semper manum intra pallium continentes" has a strong savor of Stoic apathy.) Again (XII: 10, 25): "What is the reason therefore, why those whose speech flows in a slender stream through a stony barren soil, think they possess the true Atticum saporem."[28] Quintilian warns his pupils that it is not sufficient merely "dicere presse aut subtiliter aut aspere",[29] and he warns them that they must avoid "illa Sallustiana brevitas et abruptum sermonis genus."[30] In VI: 3, 107 he says the real ἀττικισμός which carries with it "Athenarum proprium saporem" rests not so much "in singulis verbis" as "in toto colore dicendi."[31]

From various allusions it is plain that Lysias, who had been regarded as the ideal orator by the Atticists, continued to be the ideal for those who followed the Stoic theory in Quintilian's day. For our author in attempting to point out one of the great Athenian orators as the one true Attic type (and in showing the futility of such an attempt), is careful to begin his enumeration with Lysias. "Who then shall be this Attic orator?"

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[26] Ibid., X: 1, 44: Ipsorum etiam qui rectum dicendi genus sequi volunt alii pressa demum et tenuia et quae minimum ab usu cotidiano recedant, sana et vere Attica putant.

[27] Ibid., XII: 10, 21: Qua propter mihi falli multum videntur, qui solos esse Atticos credunt tenues et lucidos et significantes et quadam eloquentiae frugalitate contentos ac semper manum intra pallium continentes.

[28] Ibid., XII: 10, 25: Quid est igitur, cur in iis demum, qui tenui venula per calculos fluunt, Atticum saporem putent?

[29] Ibid., II; 8, 15: Non enim satis est dicere presse tantum aut subtiliter aut aspere.

[30] Ibid., IV: 2, 45: Quare vitanda est etiam illa Sallustiana * * .

[31] Ibid., VI: 3, 107: Ut non tam sit in singulis dictis quam in toto colore dicendi, qualis apud Graecos ἀττικισμὸς ille reddens Athenarum proprium saporem.

he says, and then rejoins :"Let it be Lysias."[32] With this must be compared his characterization of Lysias in an earlier chapter in which he calls him an orator "subtilis atque elegans", than whom you would seek nothing more perfect, "*if it is sufficient for an orator merely to teach.*"[33] The clause "si oratori satis est docere", brings us again face to face with the Stoic theory.

It will now perhaps be fitting to sum up the characteristics of this school of stylists which Quintilian so vigorously opposed.

(1) Their teaching was identical with, or at all events very similar to the theory of the Atticists.

(2) They held the Stoic conception that the function of the ideal orator is merely to teach. (Cf. Cicero's "docere, delectare movere.")

(3) They held the Stoic doctrine of "brevitas" (συντομία), in contrast to Cicero's "copia."

(4) They held the Stoic view of the embellished style *i. e*, that "nothing extraneous, nothing elaborate" should be added to the "sermo cotidianus."

(5) They held the Stoic doctrine of κυριολογία in the careful search for *the* word.

(6) They held the Stoic doctrine that speech must be in harmony with nature, and so sought their vocabulary from the ancients whose speech was nearer to the primitive and natural diction.

(7) They applied to all their words the tests of "analogia, etymologia, auctoritas. consuetudo", Varro's tests for Latinitas.

(8) They followed the Stoic theory in seeking to avoid "soloecismus" and "barbarismus"; such avoidance is Latinitas.

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[32] Ibid., XII: 10, 21: Nam quis erit hic Atticus? Sit Lysias.

[33] Ibid., X: 1, 78: His aetate Lysias maior, subtilis atque elegans et quo nihil, si oratori satis est docere, quaeras perfectius.

CHAPTER IV.

TRACES OF THE INFLUENCE OF LATINITAS IN PLINY THE YOUNGER.

In spite of the strenuous efforts of Quintilian and his masterful presentation of the Ciceronian theory of style, it seems plain from the letters of Pliny the Younger that the Stoic theory of Latinitas still obtained. Pliny himself, while he professed to be an emulator of Cicero,[1] and an imitator of the figurative style of Demosthenes,[2] frequently finds fault with the type of oratory which prevailed in his day. The complaints which he makes against it are the same which Quintilian registered against the Stoic theory. They are: (1)It sought for "brevitas" rather than "copia." Pliny gives his full approval to Isaeus,[3] who, he says, fulfills the three functions of Cicero's ideal orator, "docet, delectat, adficit" This end the orator attains through a style that is characterized by "copia et ubertas." In the twentieth letter of the first book, Pliny further praises "ubertas" by declaring that Pericles[4] stood for "copia" and then he adds that he himself desires to stand midway between the two extremes, — on the one hand, that which is expressed "ieiune et infirme" and on the other, that which is spoken "immodice et redundanter." In his effort, however,

[1] Pliny's Letters, I: 5, 12: Est enim, inquam, mihi cum Cicerone aemulatio, nec sum contentus eloquentia saeculi nostri.

[2] Idid., I: 2, 2: Temptavi enim imitari Demosthenem.

[3] Ibid., II: 3, 1 and 3: (concerning Isaeus) Summa est facultas, copia, ubertas; sermo Graecus, immo Atticus * * *. Proemiatur apte, narrat aperte, pugnat acriter, colligit fortiter, ornat excelse; postremo docet, delectat, adficit.

[4] Ibid., I: 20, 18 ff.

to attain a full-rounded style, he seems to have fallen into the fault of tumidity. At least he writes a long letter to Lupercus, defending himself against strictures on this score. A single sentence from the letter will indicate Pliny's attitude: "Quia visus es mihi in scriptis meis adnotasse quaedam ut tumida quae ego sublimia; ut improba, quae ego audentia; ut nimia, quae ego plena arbitrabar."[5] The whole letter has for its text an account of a discussion "cum quodam docto homine et perito, cui nihil aeque in causis agendis ut *brevitas* placet." Pliny says that there are many who hold this ideal of "brevitas", and he admits that it perhaps has a place "in angustissimis causis", yet for himself he would choose the copious style of Ulysses rather than the thin attenuated style of Menelaus.[6]

(2) Pliny objects to the tendencies of those stylists who, like their predecessors, the Atticists, would make Lysias the supreme model, and who looked to the orations of the most ancient Romans as the most perfect examples of Latin style.[7] He protests that Cicero surpasses Cato and the Gracchi, and that Demosthenes is to be imitated rather than Lysias.

(3) In the twenty-sixth letter of the ninth book, Pliny makes a long defense against those who attack the ornamented style. He adverts to the fact that Aeschines had censured Demosthenes for his bold metaphors and figurative language. He affirms and would prove by numerous citations that this use of figures was the secret of Demosthenes' superiority over Aeschines. The letter is plainly a retort to Lupercus and others who have criticized Pliny's attempt to realize an embellished style.

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[5] Ibid., IX: 26, 5.

[6] Ibid., I: 20, 11: Quam praestare, nisi in angustissimis causis, non potest brevitas. Ibid., I: 20, 21 and 22. With this may be compared Quint., XII: 10, 64, and Gellius, VI: 14, where Ulysses and Menelaus are used in a similar way, as examples of opposite types of oratory.

[7] Ibid., I: 20, 4: Hic ille mecum auctoritatibus agit ac mihi ex Graecis orationes Lysiae ostentat, ex nostris Gracchorum Catonisque quorum sane plurimae sunt circumcisae et breves; ego Lysiae Demosthenen, Aeschinen, Hyperiden, multosque praeterea, Gracchis et Catoni Pollionem Caesarem, Caelium, in primis M. Tullium oppono.

(4)The following account which Pliny gives of a typical orator of the class of those who strove for Latinitas, reminds one of Cicero's description of Calvus. We have in this account an orator "*rectus et sanus*", one who is over-scrupulous in his careful use of language, one whose only fault is the fault of being faultless. Pliny further places on him the mark of Stoicism, by branding his style as apethetic: "Dixi de quodam oratore saeculi nostri, *recto* quidem et *sano*, sed parum grandi et ornato, ut opinor, apte 'Nihil peccat, nisi quod nihil peccat.' Debet enim orator erigi, attolli, interdum etiam effervescere, efferri, ac saepe accedere ad praeceps."[8] An interesting side light on this type of orator, is afforded by the fourteenth letter of the second book, in which Pliny speaks of an amusing custom that was introduced by Largius Licinius and adopted by the younger advocates of his class. This was the Largius Licinius who was so devoted to the Stoic κυριολογία, that he wrote the *Ciceromastix*, scourging the great orator for his lack of precision, and his inaccurate use of words. It seems that Licinius' style of oratory was not altogether popular and did not win for itself an enthusiastic hearing, and so he found it necessary to employ certain persons to attend court and give their applause at the proper times while he was speaking. One day Domitius Afer was passing the courts, so Pliny says, and heard the applause which this subsidized audience was giving to Licinius. When he inquired what it meant, and the situation was explained to him, he declared that eloquence was dead at Rome. As a comment on this, there may be cited a sentence from another letter (II: 19, 6)in which Pliny says: "Et sane quotusquisque tam rectus auditor quem non potius dulcia haec et sonantia quam *austera* et *pressa* delectent."

Although Pliny bemoans his own style as "pressus demissusque",[9] he betrays the fact that he has been influenced by the Stoic ideal and has in a measure adopted it as a canon of style. He praises Pompeius Saturninus for his use of the "verba an-

[8] Ibid., IX: 26, 1.

tiqua"[10] and the wife of Saturninus because the diction of her letters is like that of Plautus and Terence.[10] Approving of the style of Antoninus, he says "Quam antiqua! quam arguta! quam recta!"[11] Again in commenting on the literary work of Maximus he speaks of it as "elegans, purum."[12] Of the style of Terentius Junior he says: "Quam tersia omnia! quam Latina."[13] The three books which the "elegans et disertus Fannius" has written, Pliny characterizes as "subtiles et diligentes et Latinos."[14] In the ninth letter of the seventh book he says that "pressus sermo purusque" is to be expected in letters. In one and the same sentence he mentions Demosthenes and Calvus as models in style.[15] He even goes so far in a letter to Severus, as to pray that the day may come when the florid style may yield precedence to severe and chaste composition (austeris severisque).[16]

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[9] Ibid., I: 8, 5.

[10] Ibid., I: 16, 6:(Saturninus) legit mihi epistulas quas uxoris esse dicebat. Plautum vel Terentium metro solutum legi credidi.

[11] Ibid., IV: 3, 4.

[12] Ibid., IV: 20, 2.

[13] Ibid., V: 5, 3.

[14] Ibid., VII: 9, 8.

[15] Ibid., I: 2, 2.

[16] Ibid., III:18, 10ff.

CHAPTER V.

EVIDENCE CONCERNING LATINITAS IN TACITUS.

There is much in the *Dialogus* of Tacitus to reinforce the testimony of Pliny that the Stoic theory of style still enjoyed a quiet but secure ascendancy. In describing the diction of two of the interlocutors in the dialogue, Tacitus uses the words which a Stoic would have used in giving highest praises. Of the style of Aper he says "*accuratissimus sermo* Apri nostri",[1] of Secundus: "nam et Secundo *purus* et *pressus* et, in quantum satis erat, profluens *sermo* non defuit."[2] This is unconscious testimony on the part of Tacitus that the doctrines of Latinitas still prevailed. In the thirty-first chapter he marks the different types of oratory that were fostered by the different schools of philosophy, and while he does not mention the Stoics by name, he begins with the Stoic type, thus seeming tacitly to indicate that he regarded it as worthy of first consideration. This is the characterization he gives it: "sunt apud quos *adstrictum* et *collectum* et singula statim argumenta concludens dicendi genus plus fidei meretur: apud hos dedisse operam *dialecticae proficiet.*[3] While Tacitus does not give his own approval to such a style in the *Dialogus*, in his later writings he seems in a measure to have adopted it. In two passages of the *Dialogus* he makes clear the conditions of life at Rome which made the adoption of such a style necessary to those who were public speakers. In the courts the judges insisted on Stoic brevity,

[1] Dialogus, 14, 9. References are made to the lines in Gudeman's Dialogus.
[2] Ibid., 2, 13.
[3] Ibid., 31, 22.

requiring the advocates to hew to the line, thus taking the Stoic position that the function of an orator is simply "docere" and not "docere, delectare, movere." Again Tacitus shows how under the long quietude of the reign of Augustus, by the "continuum populi otium et adsidua senatus tranquillitas et maxime principis disciplina" even eloquence herself along with all else has been subdued.

Our subject, however, will be illuminated best by a brief outline of some of the more important points of chapters XVIII, XXI, XXII, XXIII, of the *Dialogus*. In these chapters Aper severely criticises the tendency of orators of his time to hark back to antiquity for their models.

In the eighteenth chapter he shows how this tendency to depreciate the new and exalt the old, had been common to every period; he does not doubt that there were those who gave more admiration to Appius Caecus than to Cato. He declares that the ancients who were the models of Calvus were "impoliti, rudes, informes." In describing the development of Roman oratory and the contributions of various orators to that development, he says that Messalla improved on Cicero in that he was "in verbis magis elaboratus." He repeats the criticism against Cicero that was made by the Atticists: "satis constat ne Ciceroni quidem obtrectatores defuisse quibus inflatus et tumens *nec satis pressus*, sed super modum exsultans et superfluens et parum Atticus videretur,"[4]—also Cicero's criticism against the Atticists: "facile est deprehendere Calvum quidem Ciceroni visum exsanguem et aridum, Brutum autem otiosum atque diiunctum."[5]

In the twenty-first chapter he speaks of this whole school as an "infirmary" in which the patients show their bones and general emaciation too much to please his taste. In the twenty-one books of orations which Calvus had left there is only one speech which meets with his full approval. Of the speeches of Caelius he says: "sordes autem illae verborum et

[4] Ibid., 18, 20.
[5] Ibid., 18, 22.

hians compositio et inconditi sensus *redolent antiquitatem;* nec quemquam adeo antiquarium puto, ut Caelium ex ea parte laudet qua *antiquus* est."[6] He visits upon the other Atticists similar censure, granting that Caesar and Brutus had each left but one speech worthy to survive. Asinius, he says, "videtur mihi inter Menenios et Appios studuisse"—and then he adds that in imitating Pacuvius and Accius, Pollio has attained a style that is "durus et siccus." His concluding sentence sounds like an echo of Cicero's criticism of the Atticists: "oratio autem, sicut corpus hominis, ea demum pulchra est in qua non eminent venae nec ossa numerantur, sed temperatus ac bonus sanguis implet membra et exsurgit toris ipsosque nervos rubor tegit et decor commendat."

The next chapter (the twenty-second) begins with this statement: "I come now to Cicero who had the same battle with his contemporaries that I am having with you: for they gave their admiration to the ancients." Further on in the chapter Aper says that the earlier speeches of Cicero were not withou the blemishes of antiquity, and that the true orator will reject "the antiquated phrase, and whatever is covered with the rust of time." There is one paragraph in the twenty-third chapter that may well be quoted entire: "There are certain pretenders to taste who prefer Lucilius to Horace, and Lucretius to Virgil; who hold the eloquence of your favorite Bassus or Nonianus in the utmost contempt when compared with that of Sisenna or Varro; in a word who despise the productions of our modern rhetoricians, yet are in raptures over those of Calvus. We see these men posing in the courts of judicature after the manner of the ancients (as they call it), till they are deserted by the whole audience, and are scarcely supportable even to their very clients; so dreary and squalid they are; so much is their boasted *healthy* sobriety an evidence of a sickly habit and valetudinary abstinence. No physician would call that a *sound* constitution, which requires constant care and

[6] Ibid., 21, 16.

anxiety of mind; it is spirits, vivacity and vigor that I require. Prope abest ab infirmitate in quo *sola sanitas* laudatur."[7] In the words "sola sanitas" we meet again face to face the Stoic doctrine of Latinitas which made the "sermo purus et incorruptus" the supreme ideal of style.

[7] Ibid., 23, 5.

CHAPTER VI.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE STOIC THEORY ON FRONTO.

About half a century later the correspondence of Fronto furnishes very full information concerning the oratorical tendencies of that period. From certain statements that can be gathered from the letters, it would almost seem that Cicero's ideal of oratory had been rehabilitated. Fronto speaks of Cicero as the fountain-head of Roman eloquence;[1] he further says that the best type of eloquence is that which can speak "de sublimibus magnifice, de tenuioribus frugaliter,"[2] a view indentical with that of Cicero; he recognizes the three styles, and while he admits that τὸ ἰσχνόν (which may fairly be called the Stoic style) is very necessary in courts, he says that it has no place in epideictic utterances which demand embellishment and all the trappings of ornamentation.[3] He even goes so far as to repudiate the Stoic principle that the function of an orator is simply to teach (docere), and asserts that Chrysippus (whatever the Stoic theory may have been) in practice was not content merely "docere, rem ostendere, definire, explanare."[4] In the face of these statements it would seem at first thought that the Ciceronian type of oratory was the vogue; but on nearly every page of Fronto there is the imprint of the Stoic theory. Emphasis is continually laid on clearness, brevity, accuracy and precision of speech; the royal pupil of Fronto is everywhere

[1] Fronto, 63, 2. References are to the pages of S. A. Naber's Fronto, Leipsig, 1867.

[2] Ibid., 127, 5.

[3] Ibid., 125, 5.

[4] Ibid., 54, 10 ff, Ibid., 146, 19 ff. With this should be compared Fronto's praise of the style of Zeno, 114, 10: Zeno ad docendum planissimus.

admonished t search the ancient orators for the best words, and the best models of pure Latinity. The criticisms that are made of Cicero are the same as those that were made by the Atticists, and are all from the Stoic view point.

Perhaps it may be well to present the more important passages from the letters, which illustrate this attitude. The doct ine of "brevitas" is clearly set forth in a letter in which Fronto praises a certain speech which had been delivered by the Emperor. As a climax of high compliment on the style of the speech, he says: "You expressed the whole matter with such force and such conciseness that everything which the case demanded was contained in the fewest words possible."[4a] Clearness and perspicuity as an ultimate aim of the orator is likewise emphasized by Fronto. "Truly let the orator be bold" he says "as Ennius demands; but let him nowhere turn aside from a clear expression of that which he wishes to say."[5] This clearness of statement and that precision of speech which is closely allied to it, are emphasized again and again by Fronto, who enjoins upon his pupil the necessity of searching with diligence after the very best words. To Marcus he writes: "I rejoice especially that you do not lay hold of words that chance in your way, but search after the best. For there is this difference between the greatest orator and those of mediocre quality, the fact that the rest are easily content with good words, while the greatest orator is not content with the good, if there are any better."[6] The best words, in his opinion, are those which express the speaker's thought with precision. The ability to differentiate words, a knowledge of their more subtle shades of meaning, a knowledge of what Fronto calls the "modum atque pondus verbi" reveals, he declares, the "elegantia" of the speaker, and distinguishes the

[4a] Deinde *ita breviter* rem omnem atque ita valide elocutus es, ut paucissimis verbis omnia quae res posceret, continerentur.

[5] Ibid., 66, 4 ff: Sit sane audax orator, ut Ennius postulat; sed a signiñcando, quod volt eloqui, nusquam digrediatur.

[6] Ibid., 98 and 99.

"doctus" from the "semidoctus" and "semiperitus." Of the "semidoctus" he says "nec verba dare diutius potest quin se ipse indicet verborum ignarum esse, eaque male probare, et temere existimare et inscie contrectare, *neque modum neque pondus verbi internosse.*[7] Again in this same letter the whole of which might well be called an essay on the Stoic virtue of style, κυριολογία, he says: "Una plerumque littera translata aut exempta aut inmutata vim verbi ac *venustatem* commutat et *elegantiam* vel scientiam loquentis declarat. * * Nolim igitur te ignorare syllabae unius discrimen quantum referat.[8]" The severest criticism that Fronto passes on Cicero is that he does not make these nice distinctions in the use of words. The great orator is very far removed he says, from that painstaking care which searches diligently after *the* word; as a result of this negligence we seldom find in his speeches the "verbum insperatum atque inopinatum," the word which so perfectly expresses the thought that no other word may be substituted for it without loss.[9] In his discussion *de Eloquentia*, addressed to Marcus, Fronto says: "just as in time of war when there is need of mustering in a legion, we enroll not only the volunteers, but even hunt out of their hiding places those of military age, so when there is need of a defense of words, we will use not only volunteers which present themselves of their own accord, but will lure forth those that are in hiding, and will track them out that they may do our bidding."[10] * * * * "We must not stand gaping, waiting to see when the word will rain down upon our tongue like a palladium from the sky, but we must know the haunts, the glades which the words frequent in order that, when there is need of searching them out, we may advance in our search over a well known way rather than through a pathless region." The glades that are the haunts of these rare best words, are the writings of the ancient orators and

[7] Ibid., 62, 9 ff.
[8] Ibid., 64, 6 ff.
[9] Ibid., 63.
[10] Ibid., 140, 1 ff; 140, 8 ff; 62, 17 ff.

poets. First in the list, Fronto places Cato the Elder, and after him Sallust who was his imitator; Plautus and Gracchus are often named. While Fronto had his note book at hand ready to jot down the "verba notabilia et elegantia," the two authors first mentioned, Cato and Sallust, seem to have been the most abundant sources of such words. This is made plain by the frequency in the letters of such sentences as "Catonis multa legi;"[11] "partim legi ex agricultura Catonis partim scripsi;"[12] "legi Catonis orationem de bonis Dulciae."[13] Two sentences may be quoted to show that Cato was regarded as the supreme model of style. "Enim vero fandi agendique laudibus longe praestantissimus omnium Cato Porcius."[14] "Uni M. Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi."[15] In another letter, in praising the speech of his pupil he says, "prope perfecte; ut poni in libro Sallusti possit."[16] All this is an exemplification of the Stoic tendency to hark back to antiquity for perfect models and of the Stoic view that the true ἑλληνισμός was to be found only in Homer and in the language of the pre-Homeric Greeks, and the pure Latinitas only in the most ancient Latin authors and their imitators. Fronto writes to Marcus in the *de Orationibus*, "scis verba quaerere, scis reperta recte collocare, scis *colorum sincerum vetustatis* appingere" and again in the *de Eloquentia*, "ut *prisco verbo* adornares *colorem vetusculum adpingeres.*"[17]

Besides four letters in which the fault of "barbarismus" is mentioned[18] there are two passages in two different letters which in the light of citations already made, would seem to show conclusively that the doctrine of *Latinitas* still continued to constitute a well defined ideal of style. In both passages

[12] Ibid., 69, 10.
[13] Ibid., 68, 11.
[14] Ibid., 203, 6.
[15] Ibid., 36, 12.
[16] Ibid., 48, 15.
[17] Ibid., 151, 8.
[18] Ibid., 242, 4, 14.
[19] Ibid., 24, 24.

the perfection of Fronto's style is praised by those who have studied under him. In each instance meaning and connotation are so plain that it is perhaps only necessary to quote them.

"Nam de *elegantia* quid dicam? nisi te *Latine loqui* nos ceteros neque Graece neque *Latine*".[19]

"Facilius quis Phidian, facilius Apellen, facilius denique ipsum Demosthenen imitatus fuerit, aut *ipsum Catonem* quam hoc tam effectum et elaboratum opus. Nihil ego umquam cultius, nihil *antiquius*, nihil conditius, nihil *Latinius* legi."[20]

As an addendum to this chapter, I wish to call attention to certain statements made by Professor Robinson Ellis in his lecture on Fronto, a lecture delivered in December, 1903, before the students of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. On pages 11–18 of this lecture he seems without question to have misapprehended the significance of the facts which he there presents. On page fifteen, he says: "It was no part of the Stoic training to think much of rhetoric or busy oneself with questions of style: so the Emperor himself confesses in his *Reflexions* (I: 7)." Now this is not quite what the Emperor says, but granting that he said something very much like it, let us pass on for the moment to another statement made by Professor Ellis. On page seventeen he says: "With the study of grammar, the study of rhetoric advanced *pari passu*." There can be no question about the truth of this statement; but it fails to harmonize with the first statement quoted. The author seems to have forgotten that grammar had its origin with the Stoics, and that for Stoicism, grammar constituted the backbone of a theory of style. The Stoics had given themselves to a thorough study of grammar and had invented an elaborate grammatical terminology, with this one purpose in view, viz., that their speakers and writers whose sole function was to speak the truth and impart instruction, might have at their command language that was pure and in harmony with nature, — language that would serve as a proper vehicle for the pre-

[19] Ibid., 101, 22 f.
[20] Ibid., 28, 10 ff.

cise and accurate transfer of thought. That this was the real purpose of the earlier grammatical studies of the Stoics, there can be no doubt. And even in the days of Fronto, when the real purpose that had given birth to them both had almost been forgotten, grammar was still wedded to the Stoic theory of style. This is proved by the fact that in the grammatical treatise *de Barbarismo et Soloecismo*, which Herodian dedicated to the Stoic Marcus Aurelius, a prominent place is given to an enumeration of the ἀρεταὶ λόγου, which constituted a theory of style almost identical with that which had been enunciated three hundred years earlier by Diogenes the Stoic of Babylon. It has been shown already in the preceding chapter that Fronto, in giving precepts on style, clung to these ἀρεταὶ λόγου of Herodian: κυριολογία, συντομία, and σαφήνεια. It may be well, however, in disproof of Professor Ellis' assertion that "it was no part of the Stoic training to busy oneself with questions of style," to gather from his own lecture such citations from Fronto as will serve to refute his own statement.

On page eleven he says: "It is clear that with him (Fronto) oratory depended for its success almost wholly on the choice of words." Then he devotes more than a page to quotations from Fronto, establishing this statement. But this fine differentiation of synonyms, this search after *the* word is the Stoic κυριολογία.

On page thirteen he comments at length on Fronto's fondness for the pre-Ciceronian writers and his archaizing tendencies. He says: "Nor must we suppose that Fronto contented himself with merely lauding these antiquated worthies; he got copies to be made of them and dispatched them to his imperial pupil." In pointing out this very marked characteristic of Fronto, Professor Ellis has failed to observe in it but an example of the general archaizing tendency of the Stoics, which was based upon the belief that the earliest speech was the purest and that the best models of style were those ancient writers who were nearest that Golden Age when all speech was in harmony with nature.

On pages thirteen, fourteen and fifteen he calls attention to Fronto's criticism of the "copious and exuberant" diction of Seneca and of the "Neronian affectation of repeating the same idea in many different forms." He quotes at length, concluding with the following passage from Fronto's criticism of Lucan: "At the beginning of his epic he has illustrated in the first seven lines one single idea—*a more than civil war.*" Then Professor Ellis adds: "With this Neronian verbiage he rightly contrasts the condensation of Appollonius Rhodius, who in the four hexameters with which his *Argonautica* open, sums up five separate circumstances, the heroes who sailed, the course they took, the king who commanded the voyage, the purpose of the voyage, the ship which carried the Argonauts." This looks very much like a plea on the part of Fronto for the Stoic συντομία.

On page fifteen he speaks at length of Fronto's "undisguised admiration" for Sallust, the chief characteristic of whose style was συντομία. Quintilian, who took the opposite view of style, had warned his pupils that they must avoid the "*brevitas Sallustiana.*"

Pages sixteen, seventeen and eighteen he devotes to a further discussion of the archaizing tendencies of Fronto and his Age.

It seems clear that the Stoic ἀρεταὶ λόγου dominated the literary activities of Fronto and his contemporaries, and gave the impulse to the grammatical and lexicographical studies for which the age was noted. It must be admitted, however, that, although these ἀρεταί were dominant, the purpose which had given rise to the formulation of the theory—and to each of these virtues of style,—had largely been forgotten.

It is quite evident that Fronto in seeking for συντομία did not have in mind the avoidance of extraneous and artificial embellishment, but rather the fear of wearying his auditors with a style that was too copious. Again it must be admitted that while the early Stoic sought κυριολογία because of his desire to state the truth with precision, Fronto seems to have sought it chiefly as a means of rhetorical embellishment. His search

for the "verbum inopinatum et insperatum" was prompted by a desire to produce in his hearers a certain intellectual titillation and delectation. Even in following the Stoic archaizing tendency, Fronto may not have been influenced altogether by the early Stoic motive, i. e., a desire for the oldest, purest words. It is likely that here too he had in mind somewhat the embellishment of his style. For as Quintilian says, the "verba antiqua" have about them a certain "novitas," "delectatio" and "maiestas." We read in the letters of Dante Gabriel Rossetti how the poet read the early English ballads in search of "stunning old words" that would enchain attention and lend a certain dignity and charm of strangeness to his verses.

So this theory of style which was formulated by those who sought simply "docere" has in the age of Fronto been seized and appropriated by those whose chief object is "delectare." And although its ἀρεταὶ λόγου remain practically unchanged, the theory which in its origin was wholly at enmity with all that savored of rhetoric, has itself degenerated into a style as truly rhetorical as was that of Gorgias or Cicero.

But to return to Professor Ellis' statement: "It was no part of the Stoic training to think much of rhetoric or busy one's self with questions of style; and so the Emperor himself confesses in his *Reflexions* (I:7)." The real statement of the Emperor is that he has been taught by Rusticus "to abstain from rhetoric and poetry, and fine writing." But on the very next page (I: 10) he says that he learned from "Alexander, the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and not in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any *barbarous or solecistic* or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce *the very expression which ought to have been used.* This seems to indicate that the Stoics still clung to their theory of Latinitas, even though they might not approve of the rhetorical uses to which it has been put.

CHAPTER VII.

EVIDENCE CONCERNING LATINITAS IN AULUS GELLIUS.

The testimony of Fronto is thoroughly corroborated by Aulus Gellius. The evidence of the Stoic theory of style in the *Noctes Atticae* is so varied and so voluminous that it is difficult to give it a full and effective presentation. On nearly every page there is some phrase to remind one of the "sermo purus et incorruptus" which constituted the *Latinitas* of Varro and his predecessors. Gellius is continually citing the authority of those "qui purissime,- "qui integre,- "qui rectissime,- "qui probe,- "qui elegantissime,- locuti sunt."[1] Like Fronto, to be sure, he names Cicero as the foremost of orators. "Non dubium est quin M. Tullius omnium sit eloquentissimus."[2] He defends him against the "rhetores" who charge him with "soloecismus;"[3] he enters the lists against those "monstra"—those "verborum pensitatores subtilissimi" who insist that Cicero has spoken "parum integre atque improprie atque inconsiderate."[4] This defense of Cicero in itself, even if the writings of Gellius were not saturated with the Stoic terminology, would be evidence that there were those in this age who held an ideal of style, directly opposed to that of Cicero. That this opposite ideal was Stoic, is made plain by the following passage in which Gellius brings the two ideals into contrast:

"Haec M. Tullius atrociter, graviter, apte, copioseque miseratus est. Sed si quis tam agresti aure ac tam hispida, quem lux

[1] A collection of these expressions will be found at the close of this chapter on Gellius.

[2] Noctes Atticae, XVII: 13, 2.

[3] Ibid., I: 4, 1; I: 7, 1.

[4] Ibid., XVII: 1, 1 and 3.

ista et amoenitas orationis verborumque modificatio parum delectat, *amat autem priora idcirco, quod incompta et brevia et non operosa, sed nativa quadam suavitate sunt quodque in his umbra et color quasi opacae vetustatis est*, is, si quid iudicii habet consideret in causa pari M. Catonis antiquioris hominis, orationem, ad cuius vim et copiam Gracchus nec adspiravit. Intelleget, opinor, Catonem contentum eloquentia aetatis suae non fuisse et id iam tum facere voluisse, quod Cicero postea perfecit."[5]

Of this style which Gellius here seems to repudiate, he does not always speak so unfavorably. In the thirteenth chapter of the ninth book he approves Quadrigarius for his simple unadorned style that has about it the sweet flavor of antiquity — a style which aims at clearness and purity of diction.

"* * * Q. Claudius primo annalium purissime atque inlustrissime simplicique et incompta orationis antiquae suavitate descripsit." Again in the fourteenth chapter of the sixth book he clearly defines this type of speech in describing the "oratio modesta et sobria" of Diogenes the Stoic of Babylon. He characterizes the style as "gracilis"; its virtues are "venustas et subtilitas"; its faults are exemplified by those "ieiunidici et squalentes" who fall short in their attempt to be "graciles"; as an example of this type among the orators Menelaus is mentioned whose name had been used in a similar way by both Quintilian and the Younger Pliny; among the poets the representative given is Lucilius who, three hundred years before, had presented the Stoic views of style in the ninth book of his satires. With regard to embellishment, the thing in respect to which the Ciceronian and Stoic styles diverged the most, Gellius seems to have held almost the same view as Lucilius. He believed in ornamentation but it must be "castus et pudicus";[6] he seems to have approved Castricius, the rhetor, who when reading a speech of Gracchus, warned his pupils that they must not care more for rhythm and sound than for sense;[7] his attitude towards the Gorgianic fig-

[5] Ibid., X: 3, 14 and 15.
[6] Ibid., VI: 14, 11.
[7] Ibid., XIII, 1.

ures was identical with that of Lucilius;—in fact the uncomplimentary remarks that he makes about them in the eighteenth book, are but a restatement in prose of what Lucilius had said in the fifth book of his satires.

"Ομοιοτέλευτα et ἰσοκατάληκτα et πάρισα et ὁμοιόπτωτα ceteraque huiusmodi scitamenta quae isti apirocali, qui se Isocratios videri volunt, in conlocandis verbis immodice faciunt et rancide, quam sint insubida et inertia et puerilia, facetissime hercle significat in quinto saturarum Lucilius."[8]

On the three Stoic virtues of style, σαφήνεια (perspicuity), συντομία (conciseness), κυριολογία (precision and accuracy of speech), it is the last which receives special emphasis in Gellius. There is however, definite expression with regard to the first two. Concerning perspicuity the most definite utterance is to be found in the tenth chapter of the first book, where Favorinus holds up the power to speak "plane et dilucide" as an ideal for a stripling who had been over zealous in his search for the "verba vetera." It seems that this youth was in the habit of incorporating in his daily speech many "priscas voces" that were so old as to be unintelligible. Favorinus tells him that he speaks as if he were talking with the mother of Evander, and as if he wished no one to understand what he said. He concludes his criticism by giving the young man a motto from the first book *de Analogia* of Julius Caesar: "ut tamquam scopulum, sic fugias inauditum atque insolens verbum." Fronto gave this same caution to his pupil[9] and Gellius repeats it again in the seventh chapter of the eleventh book.[10]

It can hardly be said that Gellius himself stood for the doctrine of συντομία or brevitas, but nevertheless there are very clear traces of it in his writings as may be seen from the following passages:

X: 3, 4: *brevitas* sane et *venustas* et *mundities* orationis est qualis haberi ferme in comoediarum festivitatibus solet.

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[8] Ibid., XVIII: 8, 1.
[9] Naber's Fronto, 64, 1 & 2.
[10] N. A. XI:7, 1 & 2.

XIX: 11, 1 and 2: The verses of Plato are praised "quod sint lepidissimi et *venustissimae brevitatis.*"

I: 3, 12: Concerning the writings of Theophrastus: "*pensiculate et enucleate scripta.*"

I: 3, 21: Theophrastus autem in eo, quo dixi, libro *inquisitius* quidem super hac ipsa re et *exactius*, *pressiusque* quam Cicero disserit.

XX: 1, 4: Concerning the twelve tables: "Eas leges cum Sex. Caecilius inquisitis exploratisque multarum urbium legibus *eleganti atque absoluta brevitate verborum* scriptas diceret."

A very strong though indirect argument for "brevitas," is found in the doctrine of κυριολογία, for where extreme attention is given to accuracy of speech, the diction is not likely to be copious. In the pages of the *Noctes Atticae* so much is said about precision of speech that κυριολογία seems almost to be the disease of the age. When Gellius and his friends walk through the city on their "constitutionals," they discuss the exact meaning of the words in the public inscriptions;"[11] when they go to visit Fronto who is ill with the gout, they and certain other "viri docti" sit about him and discuss fine distinctions in color and seek out suitable words for such distinctions;[12] when they are entertained at dinner by Favorinus, while the food is being served, a slave stands by and reads from Gavius Bassus *de Origine Verborum et Vocabulorum*—and this reading is followed by a discussion of the etymology of "parcus";[13] when they wait in the vestibule of the palace of Caesar to give the Emperor a morning greeting, Favorinus and others discuss the genders and cases of nouns; the word "penus" is discussed.[14]

Gellius concludes his account by saying "civibus Romanis *Latine loquentibus rem non suo vocabulo demonstrare* non minus turpe est quam hominem non suo nomine appellare." In the sixth chapter of the eighteenth book there is a review of the work of Aelius Melissus *de Loquendi Proprietate.*

[11] Ibid., XIII: 25, 1 ff.
[12] Ibid., II: 26.
[13] Ibid., III: 19, 1.
[14] Ibid., IV: 1, 1.

Gellius says that the very title of the book lures one on to read it, but that the content is unworthy of the name, because the distinctions between words are too fine spun. He illustrates this by showing the distinction Melissus had drawn between "mater" and "matrona," and between "sus" and "scrofa." Throughout the whole work of Gellius there are pages and chapters devoted to this subtle differentiation of words. The following passages may be presented as illustrations:

XVI: 14: A discussion of the difference between "properare" and "festinare."

XVI: 13: Distinction between "municipium" and "colonia."

III: 14: Varro prefers "dimidiatum" to "dimidium."

XIII: 3, 1: Grammarians distinguish between "necessitas" and "necessitudo."

XIII: 25, 1: Difference between "praeda" and "manubiae."

XI: 11, 1: Distinction between "mentiri" and "mendacium dicere."

III: 10, 2: Nigidius' nice distinction between "erraticas" and "errones."

X: 26: Asinius Pollio finds fault with Sallust for his use of "transgressus."

II: 16: Sulpicius Apollinaris' discussion of Vergil's use of "longaevo."

II: 19: Chapter on the meaning of "rescire."

IV: 15: Chapter on Sallust's use of "arduum."

VII: 16: Catullus' unusual use of "deprecor" is justified by citations from Cicero and Ennius.

VI: 17: Three pages are devoted to a discussion of "obnoxius" with a certain "grammaticus."

I: 22, 9: Julius Paulus *exquisite* igitur et *comperte* dicebat.

Closely allied to κυριολογία, in fact almost identical with it, is the word "elegantia," a term which in both Cicero and Gellius seems to connote purity, clearness and precision of diction, and furthermore a term which has been used in describing the

style of Laelius and all of those who after him followed the Stoic theory of style. Closely akin to "elegantia" is the "venustas" which Gellius pointed out as one of the virtues of the "gracilis" style of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon. The frequency with which Gellius uses these two terms in praising the diction of various writers, is another evidence that the Stoic idea has a strong hold upon him and his age. The following passages may be cited as illustrating this:

V: 11, 12: Gellius praises Q. Ennius for his use of a "perquam *eleganti* vocabulo"; the term was "stata" which Ennius had applied to a woman who was neither beautiful nor homely.

IV: 15, 1: *Elegantia* orationis Sallustii verborumque fingendi et novandi studium.

XIX: 12, 1: Concerning Herodes Atticus: "*elegentia* vocum longe praestitit."

XII: 2, 1: Concerning L. An. Seneca: "Alii vero *elegantiæ* quidem in verbis parum esse non infitias eunt."

II: 22, 27: After a discussion of the names of the winds. "Haec nobis Favorinus in eo, quo dixi, tempore apud mensam suam *summa cum elegantia verborum totiusque sermonis comitate* atque gratia denarravit."

II: 26, 20: Concerning Fronto's "verborum *elegantia*."

X: 24: Die pristini, die crastini et die quarti et die quinti, *qui elegantius locuti sint*, dixisse, non ut ea nunc volgo dicuntur.

V: 20, 3: Cum Graecum autem vocabulum sit "soloecismus" an Attici homines, *qui elegantius locuti sunt*, usi eo sint, quaeri solet.

XVIII: 10, 7: A physician is told that he is "*elegantior* in medendo quam in dicendo."

X: 17: versus Laberii *pure admodum et venuste facti.*

II: 23, 2: Comoediae lepide et *venuste* scriptæ.

I: 23, 1: Concerning the style of Cato: "*cum multa quidem venustate* atque luce atque *munditia verborum.*"

IX: 3, 3: Feruntur adeo libri epistularum eius (Philip of Macedon) *munditiae, et venustatis* et prudentiae plenarum.

XIX: 9, 10: Tum (A. Iulianus) resupinus capite convelato, voce admodum quam suavi versus cecinit Valerii Aeditui, veteris poetae, item Porcii Licinii et Q. Catuli, quibus *mundius*, *venustius*, *limatius*, *tersius*, Graecum Latinumve * *.

XVIII: 7, 2: *veterum* eorum qui *electius* locuti sunt.

III: 16, 19: *veterum elegantissimi locuti sunt.*

XIX: 8, 6: Concerning Plautus: "linguae Latinae decus."

VI: 17, 4: Concerning Plautus: "homo linguae atque *elegantiae* in verbis Latinae princeps."

I: 7, 17: Plautus verborum Latinorum *elegantissimus.*

From the last three citations it is plain that Gellius and his contemporaries, following the Stoic tradition, looked to the ancients for models in "elegantia" of diction, and that Plautus still continued to be the standard in this respect for those who sought the Stoic ideal in style. It was an age in which "vetustas" was "reverenda,"[15] and the highest sanction for any usage was "omnis vetustas sic locuta est."[16] Even a man of affairs who did not trouble himself about words, was, according to the story of Gellius, so thoroughly steeped in the literaature of ancient writers that he cites Cato, Q. Claudius, Valerius Antias, L. Aelius, P. Nigidius and M. Varro, justifying his use of the form "pluria" which had been censured by a certain "reprehensor audaculus verborum."[17] This method of justifying usage by citations from ancient writers, is so common in the *Noctes Atticae* that it is hardly necessary to multiply examples. Of the four tests which Varro set up for Latinitas, the tests of "natura" (etymology), "analogia," "consuetudo" and "auctoritas," it is the last that is most frequently applied by Gellius; yet the other three are recognized. Mention has already been made of the dinner party that found diversion in discussing the etymology of "parcus" after having listened to a chapter from Bassus' book *de Origine Verborum et Vocab-*

[15] Ibid. XVIII: 5, 11.
[16] Ibid. X: 24, 4.
[17] Ibid. V. 21, 2ff.

ulorum. The following passages will further illustrate Gellius' interest in etymology:

I: 18: Some false etymologies from Aelius and Varro.

I: 25: Varro's discussion of the meaning of "indutiae" from the standpoint of etymology.

II: 6: Gellius defends a usage of Vergil that has been censured, justifying it by *etymology* and "auctoritas."

X: 5: Figulus' etymology of "avarus."

X: 11: Figulus' etymology of "mature."

XII: 14: Figulus' etymology of "saltem."

XIII: 10, 4: Figulus' etymology of "frater."

XII: 3: Etymology of "lictor."

XIX: 13, 3: Ratione etymologiae adhibita.

On seven occasions Gellius uses "analogia" as a test for Latinitas. In the twenty-fifth chapter of the second book he makes a brief statement of the ground of controversy between those who held that "analogy" should determine usage and those who held that "anomaly" was the only guide to a pure diction. He concludes this chapter by showing that Varro incorporated both principles as standards of correct usage in the "*de Lingua Latina.*" A good illustration of the application of the principle of analogy is found in the ninth chapter of the fifteenth book where Gellius shows that "frons," in order to be consistent with other third declension nouns ending in "ons," must be masculine. A sentence or two from the third and fourth sections of this chapter may well be quoted: "quanta, inquit, licentia audaciaque Caecilius hic fuit, cum fronte hilaro, non fronte hilara dixit et tam immanem *soloecismum* nihil veritus est? Immo, inquam, potius nos et quam audaces et quam licentes sumus, qui frontem inprobe indocteque non virili genere dicimus, cum et ratio proportionis, quae *analogia* appellatur et *veterum auctoritates* non hanc, sed hunc frontem debere dici suadeant."

The views of Caesar concerning correct forms are cited five times from the *de Analogia.*

IX: 14, 25: Sed C. Caesar in libro *de Analogia* secundo "huius die" et "huius specie" dicendum putat.

XIX: 8, 6 and 7: Sed enim "harenas" *parum Latine* dici quis, oro te, alius aut scripsit aut dixit? Ac propterea peto, ut, si Gai Caesaris liber prae manibus est, promi iubeas, ut quam confidenter hoc indicat, aestimari a te possit. Tunc prolato libro *de Analogia* primo verba haec ex eo pauca memoriae mandavi.

IV: 16, 9: Concerning the dative form of the fourth declension: "In libris quoque *analogicis* omnia istiusmodi sine *i* littera dicenda censet."

XIX: 8, 3: Gaius Caesar, vir ingenii praecellentis, *sermonis* praeter alios suae aetatis *castissimi*, in libris quos ad M. Ciceronem *de Analogia* conscripsit "harenas" *vitiose dici* existimat.

I: 10, 4. Has been previously quoted.

Very little is said by Gellius concerning "consuetudo" as a test of Latinitas. It seems to have yielded precedence to "auctoritas." In one place however it overbalanced ancient usage:

X: 20, 10: Sallustius quoque *proprietatum in verbis retinentissimus* consuetudini concessit et privilegium quod de Cn. Pompei reditu ferebatur legem appellavit.

The negative side of Latinitas, the avoidance of the faults of "barbarismus" and "soloecismus," is not passed by in silence by Gellius. In chapter six of the thirteenth book he discusses the nature of "barbarismus," while in the twentieth chapter of the fifth book he gives the usual definition of "soloecismus:" "Soloecismus est impar atque inconveniens compositura partium orationis."

It now remains to present those sentences and clauses gathered here and there through the *Noctes Atticae*, that will go to show that Gellius had continually in mind the doctrine of Latinitas, the "sermo purus et incorruptus," the "incorrupti loquendi observatio secundum Romanam linguam."

V: 21, 11: In ea epistula rationes grammaticas posuit per quas docet 'pluria' *Latinum* esse 'plura' *barbarum*.

XIV: 5: Concerning the vocative of "egregius."

IV: 17: Concerning the pronunciation of certain compounds of "iacio."

IV: 16: Concerning the proper spelling of the genitive singular in the fourth declension.

II: 14: Cato upheld against his "emendatores" in his use of "stitisses."

VI: 7: Concerning the proper spelling of "affatim."

VI: 9: Concerning reduplicated perfects in ancient writers.

XIII: 23, 3: Qui proprie locuti sunt primam syllabam correptam dixerunt.

VII: 15, 2: Those who made the *e* short in "quiesco" "*barbare* eum dixisse opinatus est."

XIII. 21, 20: Sic igitur "in manifesto peccatu" dixit, ut "in manifesto incestu" veteres dixerunt, non quin *Latinum* esset "peccato" dicere, sed quia in loco isto positum subtilius ad aurem molliusque est.

I: 16: The use of "mille" with a singular verb.

VI: 2, 3: Concerning the gender of "cor."

X: 13: Use of "partim" with a partitive genitive.

X: 14: Citations from Cato to show that "iniuria mihi factum itur" may be said.

I: 24, 4: Epigramma Pacuvi verecundissimum et *purissimum* dignumque eius *elegantissima* gravitate.

IX: 14, 21: In casu autem dandi qui *purissime* locuti sunt non "faciei" uti nunc dicitur sed "facie" dixerunt.

II: 20, 5: Sed quod apud Scipionem omnium aetatis suae *purissime locutum* legimus "roboraria."

VII: 9, 1: Eaque res *perquam pure et venuste* narrata a Pisone.

XIII: 19, 2: vir *modesti atque puri ac prope cotidiani sermonis.*

XIX: 8, 1: . . . . sermonibus eius (Fronto) *purissimis* . . . . fruebar.

XIX: 8, 3: "Morbo quidem," inquit "cares, sed *ver bi vitio* non cares."

XIII: 6, 4: Itaque id vocabulum quod dicitur vulgo *barbar-*

ismus, qui ante divi Augusti aetatem *pure atque integre locuti sunt*, an dixerint, non dum equidem inveni.

VI: 9, 2: Sed veterum hominum *qui proprie atque integre locuti sunt* "leves" dixerant, quos volgo nunc "viles" et nullo honore dignos dicimus.

XIII: 31, 9: . . . . verba *corrupte* pronuntiabat.

II: 20, 8: "Apiaria," a word used amoung the vulgar, but never used by those "qui *incorrupte* locuti sunt."

III: 14, 20: . . . . qui *probe* locuti sunt.

I: 7, 5: . . . . Ciceronem *probe ac vetuste* locutum.

XIII: 17, 1: Qui verba Latina fecerunt quique his *probe* usi sunt.

XX: 3, 1: . . . . qui *rectius* locuti sunt.

XX: 6, 14: qui *rectissime* loqui volet "vestrum" potius dixerit quam "vestri."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE STOIC THEORY IN SEXTUS EMPIRICUS.

A careful examination of the fourteen pages[1] which Sextus Empiricus wrote concerning ἑλληνισμός, in his fulmination πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς, affords strong confirmation of many of the statements that have been made concerning Latinitas as a theory of style. From such an examination it appears (1) that ἑλληνισμός did constitute a well defined theory of style; (2) that all ornamentation was extraneous to this style; (3) that the theory in its fundamental conception was Stoic, aiming at speech that was sound (ὑγιής) and unperverted (ἀδιάπτωτος) and in harmony with nature (κατὰ τὴν φύσιν); (4) that the four tests for ἑλληνισμός as presented by its advocates, were the same which had been offered by Varro in his definition of Latinitas, viz., natura, analogia, consuetudo, auctoritas.

We will take up the last of these considerations first. Sextus insists that it is impossible to establish any absolute test for ἑλληνισμός, that συνήθεια (consuetudo) is the only test that can be applied at all, and that συνήθεια varies with each generation, locality, and class of society.[2] So the one rule, he says, for the speaker or writer who wishes to be understood and to be free from ridicule, is to follow the συνήθεια of the audience to which he addresses his thought.[3] Thus frankly admitting that συνήθεια is ἀνώμαλός τε καὶ ἄστατος,[4] he presses the Stoic view of anomaly to its farthest limit. The larger part of his discussion, however,

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[1] All references will be to the pages and lines of Bekker's Sextus Empiricus, Berlin, 1842.

[2] Sextus Empiricus, 641, 12 ff; 650, 24 ff; 648, 22; 652, 10 ff.

[3] Ibid., 651, 21 ff.

[4] Ibid., 652, 15 ff.

he devotes to the inconsistencies of those who held ἀναλογία to be the true basis of ἑλληνισμός. It has already been pointed out in our first chapter that Diogenes recognized ἀναλογία as such a basis. Indeed it is reasonable to suppose that there were Stoics who held that language was absolutely regular in its forms, in its declension of nouns and conjugation of verbs, in that earliest Golden Age when all things were perfect. Sextus, by presenting three nouns Ἄρης, Χάρης, χάρτης which are analogues in their nominative forms, but dissimilar in their genitive endings, shows how the analogists have not followed their theory to its legitimate conclusion.[5] He further shows that some word must be taken as the basis of the analogy, and that the acceptance of this form must rest ultimately on the authority of usage (συνήθεια).[6] He devotes a page to what Varro calls "auctoritas", the view of those who maintained that the diction of the most ancient writers was the proper basis for ἑλληνισμός. To Sextus the impossibility of finding that most ancient writer, τοῦ ἄκρως ἑλληνίζοντος, seemed plain, inasmuch as there had been poets, before Homer, whose work had perished. He declares that it is absurd to think of using ἡ ἀρχαιοτάτη ἡ Ὁμήρου ποιήσις as a standard of diction, and that anyone who would use such an expression as the Homeric σπάρτα λέλυνται,[7] would be ridiculed. Moreover Homer must have been governed in his diction by the συνήθεια of the men of his time.[8] A page and a half of the πρὸς τοὺς γραμματικούς is devoted to a refutation of the view of those who δι' ἐτυμολογίας κρίνειν θέλωσι τὸν ἑλληνισμόν. Sextus shows by practical example that etymology may be a test for ἑλληνισμός, provided it is etymology backed up by συνήθεια.[9]

Since he believes that συνήθεια is the only true basis for ἑλληνισμός, it is not strange that some reference is made to it in his defi-

[5] Ibid., 652, 20 ff.
[6] Ibid., 645, 19 ff; 646, 2.
[7] Ibid., 646, 11 f.
[8] Ibid., 646, 19 ff.
[9] Ibid., 653, 16 f; 654, 21 ff.

nitions of σολοικισμός and βαρβαρισμός.[10] ὁ βαρβαρισμὸς παράπτωσίς ἐστι παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν συνήθειαν ἐν μιᾷ λέξει θεωρούμενος.

That to the mind of Sextus the doctrine of ἑλληνισμός constituted a well defined theory of style will be made plain by some half dozen citations. The theory is most clearly enunciated in the following sentence: ὅ τε ἑλληνίζων ἱκανός ἐστι πρὸς τὸ σαφῶς ἅμα καὶ ἀκριβῶς παραστῆσαι τὰ νοηθέντα τῶν πραγμάτων.[11] The adverbs σαφῶς and ἀκριβῶς seem to indicate that clearness and precision of speech constituted the "summum bonum" of this style; this of course is in entire harmony with the Stoic view that the function of an orator is simply to teach. In another passage Sextus says that the more usual forms of the word Ζεύς, *i. e.* the irregular anomalous forms (Ζηνός, Ζηνί) are more acceptable than the regularly made analogical forms, because they are σαφές;[12] then he adds that such a form as φερήσω formed by analogy with ποιήσω must be rejected on the ground that it is ἀσαφές.[13] In the paragraph in which he asserts that a speaker must adjust his language to the συνήθεια of his audience, he declares that those who are aiming at clearness (στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ καλῶς ἔχοντος καὶ σαφῶς)[14] are not to use a philosopher's vocabulary in addressing the common people, but they may use any word that is intelligible to their audience even εἰ βάρβαρόν ἐστι. Still another sentence emphasizes this thought of clearness: εἰ δ' οὐ δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀλλ' ὡς σαφέσι καὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχουσι συμπεριφέροιντο τοῖς λεγομένοις, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιμενοῦμεν.[15] But the most significant sentence of the whole discussion is one in which this plain style which aims at clearness is differentiated from the more ornate and embellished style: διόπερ εἰ καὶ ὁ ἑλληνισμὸς διὰ δύο μάλιστα προηγούμενα ἔτυχεν ἀποδοχῆς, τήν τε σαφήνειαν καὶ τὴν προσήνειαν τῶν δηλουμένων (τούτοις γὰρ ἔξωθεν κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν συνέζευκται τὸ μεταφορικῶς καὶ ἐμφατικῶς καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους τρόπους φράζειν), ζητήσομεν

[10] Ibid., 647, 17 f.
[11] Ibid., 640, 6 f.
[12] Ibid., 644, 1.
[13] Ibid., 644, 7.
[14] Ibid., 652, 1 ff.
[15] Ibid., 643, 11 ff.

οὖν ἐκ ποτέρας ταῦτα μᾶλλον περιγίνεται, ἀρά γε τῆς κοινῆς συνηθείας ἢ τῆς ἀναλογίας, ἵνα ἐκείνῃ προσθώμεθα.[16] It does not seem to be pressing the meaning of the parenthesis with its τούτοις γὰρ ἔξωθεν συνέζευκται too far, to say that we have here a conception and theory of style to which the whole idea of ornamentation and embellishment was originally extraneous.

It has already been observed (1) that the four tests applied for ἑλληνισμός are essentially Stoic, (2) that clearness and precision of speech very naturally constituted the main consideration with those who held the Stoic view that the function of an orator was merely "docere." It now remains to present the other evidence from Sextus that this conception of ἑλληνισμός is fundamentally Stoic. The words ὀρθῶς and προσήνειαν which have appeared in the previous citations, prepare one for such expressions as τὸ ἑλληνιστὶ ὑγιῶς διαλέγεσθαι,[17] and τοῦ γὰρ Ἀττικοῦ τὸ τάριχος λέγοντος ὡς ἑλληνικὸν καὶ τοῦ Πελοποννησίου ὁ τάριχος προφερομένου ὡς ἀδιάστροφον,[18] and for the statement that the diction of Homer may not be regarded as the λόγος ὑγιής.[19] Here manifestly we have a trace of the Stoic striving after speech that is sound and unperverted. There is also evidence of the Stoic principle that all things should be in harmony with nature. In one passage Sextus says: οὐκ ἄρα ἐναργές ἐστι τὸ ἑλληνίζειν. ἄδηλον δὲ εἴπερ ἐστί, πάλιν ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔκ τινος ἑτέρου γνωρίζεται, ἤτοι φυσικῷ τινὶ κατακολουθητέον κριτηρίῳ, ἐξ οὗ διαγιγνώσκεται τί τὸ ἑλληνικὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀνελλήνιστον.[20] Again he says that those who use ἐτυμολογία as a test for ἑλληνισμός must trace their word clear back to one of those words τῶν φυσικῶς ἀναφωνηθέντων.[21] In his devotion to clearness and perspicuity he says that a speaker must find words that are intelligible to his audience ὁποῖόν ποτ' ἂν ᾖ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν.[22]

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[16] Ibid., 643, 22 ff.
[17] Ibid., 648, 20.
[18] Ibid., 642, 14 ff.
[19] Ibid., 646, 12.
[20] Ibid., 642, 8 ff.
[21] Ibid,, 653, 23 ff.
[22] Ibid., 651, 25 ff; 640, 32 f; 642, 31.